Egypt’s War For Peace

Ian Tuttle
Carroll High School, Corpus Christi, Texas
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When the bells of peace ring, there will be no hands to beat the drums of war.
Even if they existed, they would be stilled…

- Anwar El-Sadat, President of Egypt, 1970-1981

Civilization’s Fountainhead, the Middle East, lies at the root of millennia of conflict. However, in no time more than our own has this discord been more clearly asseverated.

By the end of the nineteenth century, a maelstrom of ideologies and territorial claims to sacred land had become a volatile mixture; the infusion of Jewish Zionism into Palestine early in the twentieth century exacerbated this instability, creating a “framework for regional war.” The 1948 partition of Palestine and founding of Israel united Arabs against Jews in bitter wars for land, honor and survival. For the next 30 years, the Middle East imbroglio dominated regional politics, became a focus of Cold War tensions and threatened to destroy the fledgling State of Israel. However, the unique alignment of Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat with Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin transcended political boundaries to alter the social, military and political landscape of the Middle East. Against overwhelming odds, they erected the historic Peace Treaty of 1979 upon the ruins of the October 1973 Egyptian-Israeli War, setting a precedent for peace that still impacts the region today.

The end of World War I yielded weakened European colonial empires, leading many Arabs to hope for full territorial autonomy. Britain’s Balfour Declaration (Appendix A), however, impeded this goal by pledging to build a Jewish state in British-controlled Palestine, igniting Zionist immigration and Arab violence. Culminating in the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt and subsequent deportation of many Palestinian Arab leaders, the violence aroused international Arab sympathy and stimulated Pan-Arab thoughts of a united, sovereign Arab state transcending race or family ties. Arab leaders yearned to avenge 300 years of Western humiliation, erase the borders of colonialism, and negate the effects of Zionism. Britain
encouraged Pan-Arabism by creating the Arab League, in which members could display unity yet preserve independence. To resolve the regional violence—and secure Palestine, strategically vital for defending the Suez Canal—Britain issued the 1939 White Paper, nullifying the Balfour Declaration and halting most Jewish immigration, a decision that many believed cost millions of Jews their lives during the Holocaust. Following World War II, Zionists spurned Britain’s White Paper, and immigration to Palestine again burgeoned. By 1947, Britain relegated Palestinian tensions to the fledgling United Nations, which proposed UN General Assembly Resolution 181, advising the creation of two states within Palestine—one Arab and one Jewish—with an internationally governed Jerusalem (Appendix B). Zionists approved; Arabs rejected, vowing to accept only complete sovereignty over all of Palestine, including Jerusalem. Despite escalating hostilities, the UN, on May 14, 1948, created a Jewish state (Appendix C). Arab leaders, united against recognition of Israel and in support of its annihilation, invaded the next day (Appendix D). Because of the newly formed Israeli Defense Forces, the War of 1948 ended in stalemate, though Israel expanded its territory and created approximately 700,000 Palestinian refugees. Arab states refused to recognize Israel’s statehood and rejected the 1949 armistice lines as legitimate borders. Reprisal dominated Arab politics, which based prestige on eliminating Israel and reversing the effects of 1948. Egypt led this trend.

Following the 1952 Egyptian Revolution, which abolished the monarchy, Egypt became a single-party republic with Islam as its official religion. Though General Muhammad Naguib led publicly, Gamal Abdel Nasser (Appendix E) unofficially controlled the government through the Revolutionary Command Committee. Following an attempt on Nasser’s life in 1954, Nasser ousted Naguib to become Egypt’s Premier. His first orders of business—nationalizing Egyptian assets, expelling the 72-year British presence in Egypt, and purchasing Soviet military equipment—inserted Egypt into Cold War politics. In 1956, when Britain and France revoked aid for Nasser’s economic programs, he nationalized the European-controlled Suez Canal Company and closed the Straits of Tiran and Suez Canal to Israeli shipping (Appendix F), ordering military units into the Sinai Peninsula. Violence erupted on October 29 as Israeli, British and French forces attacked Egypt, terminating its blockade and occupying the Sinai. In March 1957, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower demanded Israel’s withdrawal, simultaneously pledging support for its commercial freedom. European forces, responding to U.S. and Soviet pressures, vacated the area, leading Nasser to claim victory in evicting European influence from the Middle East. To secure Israel’s access to the Straits of Tiran and avert future conflict, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), an international peacekeeping coalition, formed a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt. Meanwhile, Nasser refocused on socialist domestic policies, including requisitioning Soviet support to construct the Aswan Dam in hopes of achieving Egyptian prosperity. His formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, uniting Egypt and Syria, was perceived throughout the Arab world as a realization of Pan-Arabism and elevated Nasser to iconic status.

Meanwhile, Israel clashed with surrounding Arab nations and Palestinian guerrillas. By 1967, the tactical game of Arab-Israeli tensions presaged war. In
mid-May, relying on faulty Soviet intelligence alleging Israeli military intentions against Syria, Nasser ordered 60,000 men and heavy weaponry into the Sinai Peninsula and, on May 16, ordered the removal of UNEF (Appendix G). However, it was not until May 23 when word of Nasser’s most shocking tactic reached Israeli leaders. Affirming its “rights and sovereignty,” Egypt closed the Aqaba Gulf and Straits of Tiran to Israeli traffic, threatening military action should Israel retaliate. Because it denied Israel access to its vital Iranian oil source, the blockade was considered an act of war, but Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol—futilely hoping for French, British or American intervention—remained wary of military action. For three weeks, tensions mounted as Arab, Israeli, Soviet and American leaders debated options. The “unbearable tension of waiting with the life of [Israel] in the balance” finally provoked Israel’s bold gamble for survival.

On June 6, 1967, Israeli air forces launched a preemptive attack, decimating Egypt’s grounded air force and annihilating six Egyptian bases, including four in the Sinai, within 30 minutes. Had the attack failed, only 12 planes would have remained to defend the entire nation. Egyptian media issued falsified reports of Egyptian victory, claiming a counterstrike had downed 86 enemy aircraft, including an American bomber. Cairo’s streets overflowed with “hundreds of thousands of people chanting ‘Down with Israel! We will win the war!’” Even Nasser was unaware of what was actually occurring on the battlefield.

The Israeli rout of June 6 through 13 established the Six-Days War as one of the most impressive military victories in history. The casualty rate was 25 to 1 in favor of Israel. Israel also captured 42,000 square miles of territory, including Jerusalem (Appendix H), and destroyed or captured $2 billion worth of Egyptian military hardware—85 percent of Egypt’s total. The most important result, however, was psychological. Defeat crushed Arab morale and military confidence; Nasser, humiliated, resigned as president, but the distraught Egyptian people demanded his return. Although the war further augmented Arab-Israeli tension, The Disaster, as Arabs named the defeat, marked “a watershed [moment]—a brutal awakening that Arab socialist leaders had deceived their followers” with nationalistic idealism. Yet Arabs still longed for military retribution against Israel, leading to the War of Attrition. Regular skirmishes initiated by Egyptian forces “pecked away” at Israel’s “soaring” morale over the next three years. This unconventional war became the testing ground for developing technology and military science throughout the Middle East.

The six years (June 1967-October 1973) that separated the Six-Days War from the October War fell into four phases: the first three were attempts at peace, the fourth preparation for war. The United Nations brokered its sole peace attempt in Security Council Resolution 242, adopted November 22, 1967. The resolution necessitated two clauses: “withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; and termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” While Israel reluctantly accepted the resolution, Nasser stated that “that which
was taken by force will be regained by force.”

Rejection of 242 by Iraq, Syria and the unofficial Palestinian Liberation Organization\(^*\) dismantled further UN efforts. With UN efforts terminated, newly elected U.S. President Richard Nixon sent Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as a diplomatic intermediary,\(^*\) who also proved unsuccessful. The United States and the Soviet Union also tried to persuade Israel to conduct coordinated withdrawals and Egypt to guarantee Israel safe passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. Though meetings dragged on from April 1969 through September 1971, they finalized no agreement,\(^*\) and resolution to the conflict seemed unattainable until, following Nasser’s death in 1970, Anwar El-Sadat (Appendix I) assumed the presidency.

Although his “leadership style and political philosophy were different from Nasser’s, Sadat’s devotion to Egypt was the same. His foremost motivation was to bring democracy and peace to Egypt.” Sadat replaced Nasser’s failed socialism with limited free-enterprise, expelled Soviet advisors, initiated secular modernization, and introduced restricted democratization,\(^*\) though ultimately his social policies failed to secure civil liberties or economic prosperity.\(^*\) Meanwhile, the 1967 War had arrested Egyptian dignity and pride, and the failed attempts at peace had left foreign powers unwilling to participate in further negotiations. Sadat, realizing that peace was unattainable without foreign—particularly American—intervention, saw no option but to display Egyptian military competence and regain Egyptian honor by force.\(^*\) Sadat’s aims, however, sharply contrasted with those of his predecessors. He sought recovery of lost territory and pride rather than Israel’s destruction. He also broke from Arab ideology, desiring not only to regain Egyptian ownership of the Sinai but also to “quell Pan-Arab identity and achieve an agreement for Egyptian purposes.” Moving Egypt away from nationalistic, Pan-Arab policies and toward his “‘Egypt-first’ principle would allow Sadat to negotiate without the limitations of Arab nationalistic ideologies,\(^*\) something other Arab states opposed. However, Sadat was determined to see Egypt and Israel meet “as equals, not as victor and defeated.”\(^*\) Therefore, after months of preparation,\(^*\) Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi forces attacked Israel\(^*\) on October 6, 1973.\(^*\) Sadat believed that by defeating the “impenetrable Israeli wall” defending the Suez Canal, he could prove Egyptian military competence and regain national pride.\(^*\) International pressure compelled an impotent ceasefire, founded on UN Security Council Resolution 338, on October 22, 1973,\(^*\) but fighting continued until October 27, when Israeli and Egyptian officials reached an agreement.\(^*\)

Though Egypt was not victorious, Sadat’s October War “shattered the image of Israeli invincibility, which had persisted since the Six-Days War,”\(^*\) and boosted Arab morale. Where the Six-Days War had devastated Egyptian pride, prohibiting peaceful diplomacy, the October War allowed Egypt to regain the honor necessary to negotiate.\(^*\) Sadat then made the boldest diplomatic move in modern Middle East history—a public “pronouncement that he would go to Israel for the cause of peace.”\(^*\)

Although Golda Meir, Israel’s prime minister during the 1973 War with Egypt, asked Sadat “what took [him] so long”\(^*\) to travel to Israel, Sadat had been in no position to negotiate peace until Egypt regained its honor. Additionally, in Israel, Meir’s left wing Labour Party openly supported negotiations with Arab
nations, while right wing leaders were wary of diplomatic movement. Had Meir embraced peace negotiations with Sadat, the Israeli political atmosphere would likely have suffered a severe partition. Succeeding Meir as prime minister, however, was Menachem Begin, leader of the conservative, right wing Likud Party. Assuming leadership on June 20, 1977, Begin’s policies marked a transformation in Israeli politics.

Although Begin was “a true believer, a true Zionist in the Revisionist school”—a branch of Zionism supporting Israeli control over Biblical Palestine, including the West Bank and parts of Jordan—and supported hard-line negotiations with Arab states, he began negotiations regarding the Sinai, which was of no importance in the Revisionist tradition. By taking what seemed to some as a left wing stance on the premier political issue of the day, he transcended political boundaries and enabled Israelis to barter for peace without partisan limitations.

Sadat accepted Begin’s first step toward peace—an invitation to speak before the Israeli legislature, or Knesset, on November 20, 1977 (Appendix J). Ignoring past precedent and pressure from other Arab nations, Sadat arrived “on solid ground to shape a new life and to establish peace,” becoming the first Arab leader to recognize the State of Israel. That “first step” was followed a year later, September 1978, with a second when Sadat and Begin met at Camp David, Maryland, to discuss peace terms with U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Negotiations were complicated. Sadat sought a vague agreement that would pacify Palestinian anxieties, while Begin desired a clear, limited arrangement that would satisfy his Zionist principles. Both leaders strained under accusations of betrayal, Sadat from Arab leaders and Begin from conservative constituents. The leaders’ personal interactions also complicated proceedings. Although Sadat and Carter admired each other—Carter referred to them as “soul mates”—and Carter “always relied on Sadat to make the necessary sacrifices” amid negotiations, the relationship between Begin and Carter was purely professional. Sadat and Carter also conducted private conferences in which Sadat enumerated additional concerns and principles. Despite the difficulties, the meetings resulted in the Camp David Accords, an understandably ambiguous but positive framework for peace founded on UN Resolution 242 of 1967.

Subsequent concentrated negotiations produced the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, signed on March 26, 1979 (Appendix K). Though no other Arab nation signed the treaty, it remained the first peaceful resolution to Middle Eastern conflict, establishing a precedent for future Middle Eastern diplomacy. In 1994, the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty was created and, a year later, the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Additionally, in 1997, Israel reached the Hebron Accord, an agreement with approximately 150,000 citizens of the West Bank city of Hebron securing the withdrawal of Israeli troops. These agreements have, in their own right, altered relations, defense strategies and political machinations throughout the Middle East.

The presence of Israel in the Middle East has fueled generations of deadly conflict. Arab dignity and Israeli survival, however, have demanded such drastic measures. Although Anwar Sadat initiated conflict with Israel by waging his 1973 October War, he was able to carve in blood a pathway to lasting peace, ensur-
ing that “generations of Egyptians to follow have never gone to battle.” Sadat dared to violate the Arab status quo and proffer an olive branch while Menachem Begin overcame political discord in Israel to facilitate the pursuit of peace. While tensions remain in the Middle East—and a true, lasting peace among its parties is evasive—the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty sets a precedent for peace, tolling clearly through the cacophony of Middle East chaos, providing hope that the “bells of peace will ring” in the light of historic compromise.

Notes

4. Dennis Ross, Personal interview by author. 6 Sept. 2007.
5. Oren, 3.
8. Zamir.
12. Isseroff.
13. Hahn.
15. Hahn.
17. Oren, 8.
19. Ajami.
20. Oren, 55-84.
23. Stein.
25. Stein.
27. Stein.
29 Herzog, 196.
32. Insight Team, 16-17.
34. Oren, 326.
35. Insight Team, 23.
36. Ibid, 24-25.
39. Anonymous, Facilitated interview between author and relatives of interviewee.
28 Sept. 2007
42. Sadat interview.
43. Insight Team, 15.
44. Herzog, 239.
45. Zamir.
46. Lewis, Telephone interview.
47. Insight Team, 402.
51. Sadat interview.
52. Stein.
Internet.
55. Lewis, Telephone interview.
57. Stein.
58. Rackers, 128.
61. Lewis, Telephone interview.
63. Rizk.
64. Ross interview.
66. Sadat interview.
67. Rackers, 126.

Annotated Bibliography

Primary Sources

Interviews

Anonymous. Facilitated interview between author and relatives of interviewee. 28 Sept. 2007.

This interview is with a relative of one of my peers; however, because of the sensitive nature of his work and fears for familial security, this source requested anonymity. However, his extensive work in the upper echelons of Egypt’s United Nations delegation and his relations with Egypt’s neighbor, Libya, provided excellent information from an incomparable level of involvement into the peace process of the Middle East and diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt. He also helped me understand what is required for peace and explained how the events of the past have contributed to the nations’ current rapport.


Ambassador Gordon S. Brown spent more than 35 years in the U.S. Foreign Service specializing in relations with the Middle East. Early assignments included diplomatic work in Lebanon (1962-1963), Iraq (1963-1966), Egypt (1966-1969), France (1973-1976), and Saudi Arabia (1976-1978). He served as Ambassador to Mauritania and as political advisor to General Norman Schwarzkopf during the first Gulf War (1991-1994). Information from this interview helped me understand the complicated process involved in Middle East negotiations. As a diplomat in other Arab nations during the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, Ambassador Brown demonstrated the difficulties American diplomats faced in trying to establish stable relationships with Arab nations while
maintaining support for Israel. It was beneficial to better comprehend the complexities of U.S.-Middle East relations during the Egyptian-Israeli peace process.


Arthur R. Day graduated from Chicago University in 1948 with a master’s degree in International Studies. One year later, he joined the Foreign Service, where he worked in Germany, Chile, and the Middle East. He served as the Consul General to Israel, working in Jerusalem, and later as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Mr. Day was also a member of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and United Nations’ Conference on Disarmament. This interview focuses on Mr. Day’s involvement in Middle Eastern affairs and his analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly its resolution under the Carter administration and the contributions of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. This interview provided me with a primary account of Middle Eastern relations, particularly those that occurred during the peace negotiations under the Carter administration, from someone who was working decidedly in Israel. It was a helpful contrast to those whom I interviewed who were working in America or shuttling between nations.


Herbert J. Hansell served as Legal Advisor to the Department of State under the Carter administration. This interview provided me with an analysis of Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations from a legal advisor during that process. Herbert Hansell and his colleagues, as members of the State Department, were significantly involved in the peace process, and his legal analysis gave me a new perspective on the negotiations. He also provided valuable commentary on the negotiating abilities and distinct personalities of Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin.


John W. Holmes graduated from Columbia University in 1957, majoring in history. After graduating, Mr. Holmes entered the Foreign Service and worked in Iran, Italy, and Vietnam, and in the U.S. Economic Bureau of State. He also served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Rome and, most recently, as Senior Associate of the World Peace Foundation. Mr. Holmes has written a book, Maelstrom, on the state of U.S. relations with the Mediterranean world. Though this interview did not focus on Middle Eastern affairs, Mr. Holmes offered commentary on the relationship between Israel and some Arab nations with those of southern Europe. This information was valuable, for me, as an exploration of the position of the Middle East in its global context during the years of its extensive conflict.


This interview, conducted by Walter Cronkite, focuses on the visit of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Israel to speak to the Knesset. The relationship of Sadat and Begin is explicated some in this interview and was helpful in providing primary
information on the negotiations of Sadat and Begin leading up to Sadat’s visit to Israel. It was also important to note that Sadat and Begin were willing to associate publicly to ensure that this visit happened and to promote subsequent peace. Realizing this was important to estimating the value and state of the leaders’ relationship. This relationship was, obviously, crucial to their ability to effectively negotiate.


From 1969 to 1975, Dr. Kissinger served as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and from 1973 to 1977, he was the 56th Secretary of State of the United States. Dr. Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973 for his integral part in facilitating a ceasefire in the October 1973 War among Egypt, Israel, and Syria. His contribution to Middle East affairs is indisputable, and this interview was helpful in discerning his carefully considered opinion on the state of that region today. This interview assisted my understanding of the region’s current conflicts and their potential resolutions from the mind of a key participant in resolving past Middle East conflict.


David A. Korn joined the Foreign Service in 1957, subsequently serving as a diplomat in France, Lebanon, Morocco, and Mauritania. He has served as Director for Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs for the U.S. State Department. Mr. Korn has also published work on international relations, including works on Middle East affairs and history. This interview with Mr. Korn was very helpful in improving my understanding of U.S.-Israeli relations in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Mr. Korn, as an envoy and diplomat for the United States, was able to provide a reliable account of events occurring in those years and their diplomatic consequences.


George M. Lane entered the Foreign Service in 1957. He served in the office of European Regional Affairs, then as a trainee in Lebanon. He worked as a Commercial Officer in Saudi Arabia, as an Economic Officer in Syria, as a Political Officer in Morocco, and as the Principal Officer in the Libyan Embassy. Following these assignments, Ambassador Lane returned to the United States where he served as a Personnel Officer in the Bureau of African Affairs. Following this, he worked in Swaziland and Lebanon. In 1978, he was appointed Ambassador to Yemen. In 1982, he became Diplomat in Residence at Portland State University in Oregon, then, after retiring in 1986, became the Political Advisor to the Deputy Commander in Chief of the United States European Command at Stuttgart, Germany. This interview with Ambassador Lane was helpful in ascertaining the difficulties the United States faced in developing working relations with Arab states while simultaneously maintaining a relationship with Israel. This was the difficult position in which Ambassador Lane found himself as an ambassador in the Arab world, and it was helpful to better understand that complicated position. It gave me a more rounded understanding of the complications of international relations.


Ambassador Lewis’ contribution to my understanding of Middle Eastern diplomacy
was invaluable because of his personal experience working within the Middle East to broker peace. Possessing degrees from Yale and the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Ambassador Lewis had a diplomatic career that spanned more than three decades. Ambassador Lewis was the United States’ Ambassador to Israel for eight years under the Carter and Reagan administrations, during which he participated directly in the formation of the Camp David Accords, the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, and subsequent peace measures. Lewis has conducted diplomatic operations in Europe, the Middle East, and South America. He also, from 1986 to 1987, was the first Senior International Fellow at Tel Aviv University’s Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African studies. He currently serves as Senior Policy Advisor for the Israel Policy Forum and as Board member of the American Academy of the Diplomacy, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, the Institute of World Affairs, and Search for Common Ground in the Middle East. He also works with the Council on Foreign Relations, the Middle East Institute, and the United Nations Association, among others. This interview with Ambassador Samuel Lewis was a beneficial addendum to our conversation (see directly below). This interview delves quite extensively into the numerous specific tasks and assignments of Ambassador Lewis, and offers a detailed analysis of the peace process in which Ambassador Lewis participated deeply and his other engagements in the Middle East. It was helpful in gaining background on Ambassador Lewis’ involvement in the Middle East and his particular accomplishments in that region.

- - - Telephone interview by author. 12 May 2008.

Ambassador Lewis’ (see above) eyewitness account and cultivated insight into the negotiations and stratagems that allowed for Egyptian-Israeli peace were incomparable. As a high-ranking American official, he was not only able to provide a detailed account of the negotiations that occurred but also explained the American reaction and the treaty’s influence on Cold War politics. Having been an integral member of the negotiations that occurred at Camp David, Ambassador Lewis provided me with personal recollections and analysis of the players—including Carter, Sadat, and Begin—and the machinations that occurred during the negotiations. His eyewitness account of the negotiations was incomparable.


Mr. Nassar is a retired principal and educator from Omar ibn Abdel Azziz Middle School in Cairo, Egypt. Born August 21, 1921, he has lived in Egypt his entire life. He is the grandfather of one of my peers, and Mr. Nassar’s son translated both my questions and Mr. Nassar’s responses. Mr. Nassar provided important information regarding the popular Egyptian opinions of Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser and their legacies. Having lived through both presidencies, Mr. Nassar was supremely qualified to comment, as an Egyptian citizen, on both men’s leadership. His commentary was a beneficial contrast to Simcha Stein and Gilian Zamir, Israeli citizens whom I interviewed. Understanding the perceptions and opinions of Egyptian citizens regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict was integral to fully appreciating its effects.

Sadat, Jehan. [lwrva@comcast.net] Email interview by author. 6 January 2008.

Jehan Sadat is the widow of deceased Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat, whose efforts for peace fundamentally altered the Middle East. Dr. Sadat was active in the
political efforts of her husband and a foundational supporter of his work throughout her life. Consequently, she was an invaluable source for my research, granting me knowledge and insight that only someone of her position and connection with former Egyptian politics could have gleaned. Dr. Sadat helped me understand more fully the emotions of the Egyptian people in the many trying circumstances they endured. She also helped me understand the motivation behind her husband’s efforts for peace and the impetus behind his presidential efforts in all aspects of his leadership. Dr. Sadat currently resides in Arizona and remains an active leader at the University of Maryland’s Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development.


Simcha Stein was a soldier in the Israeli Army during the June 1967, or Six Days, War and Israel’s subsequent conflicts. His testimony was extremely helpful in determining the great resolve Israeli soldiers possessed for protecting their homeland and fledgling nation. He lost many friends in these battles, especially during his time in the hazardous Golan Heights, an embattled region on the Israeli-Syrian border. Though he is a dedicated soldier, Mr. Stein is also an Israeli citizen and a father who greatly desires peace with all of Israel’s surrounding neighbors to ensure a future for the State of Israel.

Speeches


Anwar Sadat’s speech was a powerful, landmark event in the history of Middle Eastern relations. It was the first step to peaceful relations between Israel and Egypt and was a building block to the eventual peace treaty between those nations. Though some accuse Sadat’s speech of failing to propose workable solutions to pressing Middle Eastern quandaries, it remains an excellent rhetorical work and a powerful message for the all of the peoples of the Middle East.

Government Documents


The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, established in 1979, was a landmark document that altered the course of history in the Middle East—and throughout the world—and set a precedent for diplomatic relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This copy of the document not only provided me with the document’s original text but also contained secondary information that was valuable for my research. The secondary information present helped me place the document in its historical context to more fully realize the difficulty of creating such a document in the first place amid a hostile regional atmosphere.


As noted, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was a landmark event in the course of modern history. This site provided me with additional secondary information to comple-
ment my research of the document. This additional information helped me understand the extent of the document’s comprehensiveness and attention to detail in the matter of future Egyptian-Israeli relations.


The Camp David Accords formed a landmark document in the Middle Eastern peace process, setting the stage for the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel that occurred months later in 1979. Though the accords were by no means a comprehensive framework for peace—nor did they ensure a later treaty—the chances of creating a full peace treaty would have been slim without this preliminary framework. Reading the accords helped me more fully appreciate the subsequent peace treaty and understand the foundation upon which that peace was based. Also, a comparison of the documents was interesting as a means of discovering the actual versus predicted peace terms of this conflict.


This article analyzes extensively the impact of African nations on the Middle East conflict. It details Israeli actions and consequent African and Arab movements that have affected diplomacy in the Middle East and elsewhere, providing information from the 1950’s to the present. This document helped me understand the significance of Israeli foreign strategy in a frequently overlooked area: Africa. The influence of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been sizable there. I was able to appreciate the seemingly global influence of the conflict in the Middle East.


This letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower iterates the American position on Israel’s occupation of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula following the Suez Crisis of 1956. In this letter, President Eisenhower requests the removal of all foreign troops, except those of the United Nations Emergency Force, from the territory as a condition of American support of Israeli commercial freedom through the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran. This information provided me with the stance of American executive leadership following this important conflict. This stance remained influential over the subsequent years in Middle Eastern relations.


This document, issued some years prior to the outbreak of my targeted military conflict, helped me understand the views of the three major Western powers regarding the volatile situation in the Middle East. This article helped me gain insight into the public views of these nations regarding the area, though, personal views were frequently different from those made public. This declaration, however, was an important alliance of the Western powers in response to the rising tensions in the Middle East.

Johnson, Lyndon Barnes. Letter to King Hussein. 23 November 1966. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Archives, Austin, TX.
This letter from President Johnson to King Hussein of Jordan helped me understand the initial relations between President Johnson and Arab leaders in the Middle East prior to the escalation of conflicts between the parties. The Israeli strike on Jordan as a result of terrorist activities within Israeli borders was a significant factor in the later development of tensions among Israel and its Arab neighbors. Understanding the reaction of the American government and its leader to prior events that would be prominent one year later helped me gain a better idea of the larger circumstances of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the American role.

---. Letter to Levi Eshkol. 22 May 1967. Lyndon Barnes Johnson Presidential Archives, Austin, TX.

This letter from President Johnson to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol helped me better understand the strength of relations between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol. I was able to more fully realize the extent of their communication in trying to resolve the impending difficulties. It also gave me a glimpse at some of the diplomatic measures attempted by President Johnson prior to the outbreak of military action.


This memorandum of a “Top Secret” Presidential Cabinet meeting, drafted by Tom Johnson, briefly illuminates the struggles experienced by American diplomatic mediators in the aftermath of the June 1967 War. Key Executive officials offer insight into American relations with Egypt and Israel, as well as commentary on the position of the United States in facilitating peace following that conflict. This memorandum helped me understand the attitude of American officials toward the Middle East in the months following the 1967 War.


This document allowed me a better understanding of the options available to the United States in handling the situation in the Middle East. It outlined the different strategic options available to the nation and gave extensive background on the situation, which was also helpful.


Rostow’s memorandum helped me more fully realize the extent of the United Nation’s involvement in resolving the impending Arab-Israeli conflict. It also helped me understand the goals of the United States in its behavior within the United Nations Security Council.


This memorandum from Rostow was very helpful in outlining the primary concerns of each of the involved parties in the months following the June 1967 War. Rostow
carefully outlines the conditions presented by the various bodies as well as certain issues—such as government of Jerusalem—important to a lasting resolution. He also comments on these conditions, offering cultivated insight. Moreover, he places these items in a larger context as he also analyzes American-Soviet relations. This document helped me better understand the complex desires held by each of the parties in the months following Middle Eastern violence.

- - -.  “Memorandum to Mr. President.” Memorandum. 31 May 1967. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Archives, Austin, TX.
This primary document helped me understand the view of the Israeli government in the face of their situation. Ephraim Evron’s view was extremely important because he was integral to the diplomatic process during the period of the conflict. He was also instrumental in lobbying for Israeli interests with the United States.

- - -.  “Memorandum to Mr. President.” Memorandum. 1 June 1967. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Archives, Austin, TX.
This primary document from Walt Whitman Rostow, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs under Lyndon Baines Johnson, helped me gain insight into the views of other Western powers toward the Middle East conflict, in this case that of Belgium. This allowed me, also, to understand more fully the dilemma facing the United States and its goal to create a coalition devoted to ending this conflict.

In this document, Secretary of State Dean Rusk records a conversation between Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban and advisor Robert Anderson on October 4, 1967. Rusk’s document notes interest from Israel in pursuing covert communications with other Arab states; he comments on this desire and its implications for peace in the Middle East. This document was, for me, revelatory in its suggestions on the openness of Middle Eastern states toward peace.

This telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk details a conversation between Walt Rostow and Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman. The document carefully notes the cooperative diplomatic efforts and desires of both the United States and Israel to reach a resolution on questions of settlement, territorial occupation, arms movement, and refugees. Rusk also offers commentary on Harman’s input and the Israeli position. This document helped me understand the United States’ attempted role in diplomacy in the Middle East question, as well as Israel’s attitude toward American intervention.

Dean Rusk (United States Secretary of State, 1961-1969), in this primary docu-
ment, comments on the high tensions in the Middle East following the June 1967 War and describes American diplomatic efforts. He offers extensive commentary on the American relationship with Egypt’s Nasser, Israel, and the shifting dynamics of both relationships. This document also provided information on American-Soviet relations as a result of the aforementioned conflict. Because of the dramatic effects of the hostilities and international relations on America’s position in the Middle East, this document was very important in more fully understanding the place of the United States in Middle East involvement.


This primary document is from Harold “Hal” Saunders, a high-ranking diplomat under Presidents Lyndon Baines Johnson and Jimmy Carter who was extremely influential in handling the Arab-Israeli military conflicts and later the Israel-Egypt peace agreement of 1979. This valuable source allowed me to better understand the viewpoint of the United States government in grappling with the conflict broiling in the Middle East in 1967 just prior to the June 1967 War.


This primary document from Harold Saunders was helpful in allowing me to better understand the opinions of other Arab governments regarding Nasser and the political climate. In reading this, I was more fully able to appreciate the cooperation that existed among Arab leaders in the face of their mutual enemy, Israel.


This memorandum details a tense political situation between the United States and Israel, in which Israeli leaders feel that the United States is pressuring them into concessions to the Arabs. Whether or not this was true, the tense political situation is clearly evident, as described in this memorandum, and that was a new facet of the international political atmosphere for my research. The document also helped me understand the dynamic relationship between the United States and Israel in 1967, following the summer’s armed conflict.

Thompson, Llewellyn. “Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Depart-

This primary document from Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson details an episode of American-Soviet relations following the June 1967 War. Because Cold War politics were an integral part of the atmosphere that sparked the Arab-Israeli conflict, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union—and its respective influence on the Middle East—was vital to my research. This document gave me a fuller understanding of the intricate state of affairs surrounding diplomatic relations in the Middle East and between the global superpowers.


I used this document within my appendix. The image displayed there is of a document formally announcing the Gulf of Aqaba closed to Israeli maritime traffic. This event was a catalyst of the June 1967, or Six Days, War.

Newspaper Articles


This article notes what was a pivotal event in the histories of Great Britain and Egypt. Liberation of Egypt was a blow to the colonial empire of Britain, while it was a crowning achievement for decades of Egyptian resistance. This article explains the importance of that liberation and its potential effects. It helped me understand the complex history behind European involvement in the Middle East and common global attitudes regarding this relationship.


This article from The New York Times expresses world attitudes about the proclamation of a British-appointed king to Egypt following Egyptian independence. The article also elaborates upon the potential consequences and future actions with regard to this action. The article was integral in helping me understand the complex relations between Great Britain and Egypt, which continued even following Egyptian independence.

Magazine Articles


This primary magazine article from TIME Magazine delves extensively into the Soviet presence in the Middle East during early 1970 and offers potential American solutions to this Soviet involvement. The article also explores the reactions of Israel and the Arab states to increased Soviet intervention in Middle Eastern armament. This article was very helpful in ascertaining the American media’s opinion of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and Cold War tensions.
Books


*The Blood of Abraham* is former President Jimmy Carter’s illumination of the Middle East question that was pivotal to his presidency. Because of President Carter’s personal experiences working in the Middle East to develop peace, this account and analysis was insightful and beneficial not only to my own understanding of President Carter’s experience but also to the circumstances surrounding the conflict in the Middle East.

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President Carter’s memoirs of his term in the White House were extremely important in gaining a detailed picture of the diplomacy and machinations that gradually facilitated peace between Egypt and Israel during his term in office. This work, complete with relevant unedited diary entries, gave me a new perspective—that of the third party intermediary, the United States. President Carter’s personal recollections helped me form more complete views of the sundry personalities involved and the concessions, sacrifices, and compromise required from both sides to allow a peaceful resolution.

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*Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid*, is a recent analysis of the Middle East conflict from former President Jimmy Carter. In it, he uses his personal experience of Middle Eastern diplomacy as President, combined with numerous years of maintained interest and close observation, to analyze the conflict and enumerate possibilities for resolution. Because the Palestinian-Israeli territorial conflict lies at the heart of the Middle East’s hostilities, this analysis was important in gaining foundational information for the plethora of other conflicts there.


This book was a brilliant compendium of factual and anecdotal information about every major war in which the State of Israel has participated from its birth to 1982. This book’s purpose was mainly to serve as the primary informer of the War of Attrition, a three-year, sporadic military encounter between Israel and the Arab states (mainly Egypt) and as supplementary information for the Yom Kippur War, or October War, fought in 1973. The book was extremely helpful not only as a work of credible researched information but also as one that drew on personal experiences (Herzog’s own) to round out an immense exploration of Israeli military conflicts.


As Lyndon Johnson was President during the Six-Day War and part of the tune leading up to it, his memoirs were an invaluable source of information. From his work I gleaned an interesting viewpoint into the Middle East region and, particularly, the United States’ relations with the countries in that area. I was able to more fully understand America’s diplomatic goals in the region after examining the insights of the President during that time period. Also, due to the nature of the tense relations between the United States and the former United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) during President Johnson’s term in office, his work gave me a unique insight into that relationship and its impact on the Middle East crisis.

This book was extremely helpful in providing landmark speeches in Arab-Israeli history, speeches that have changed the political landscape or articulated the complex values and ideologies of each side. This book provided a compendium of such speeches from the birth of the State of Israel to the present day. Reading the words of the great leaders throughout this conflict helped me more fully understand the issues through the eyes of the major historical figures.


This book was very helpful in gathering information about the Yom Kippur or October 1973 War. Based on primary coverage of the war and written by journalists actually in the war zones, the book helped me better understand the conflict in its many facets. Because the Yom Kippur War was such a complex conflict, fueled by many motives, this book was extremely helpful in gathering the necessary information to help portray the significance of the conflict.

**Videos**


*Arab and Jew* was an excellent production that gave me interesting information and, more importantly, a better perspective of my overall topic. Instead of focusing on the political or military aspects of the Israeli-Arab conflict, it instead concentrated on everyday people and their opinions and emotions regarding the topic. This helped me more fully understand my topic and view it from a different angle. This film helped me write with an understanding of all sides of this sensitive issue and allowed me to better explicate all views.


This edition of *Nightline* was the newscast performed directly after the assassination of Anwar el-Sadat, President of Egypt from 1970 to 1981. It provided helpful primary information on Sadat’s assassination and the world’s immediate reaction. Because the newscast was so near to the date of Sadat’s assassination, little information was at that tune known. Thus, this video did not give me much objective information because of its proximity to its subject. However, it allowed me a better understanding of the circumstances of his presidency, his influence on nations and peoples across the globe, and the world’s reaction to Sadat’s assassination.


This *Nightline* production was a reflection on one of their greatest TV news stories: that produced on the death of Anwar el-Sadat. It not only combined the emotional substance present in the newscast, but also provided factual information that helped me understand circumstances surrounding Sadat’s death, the perpetrators, their motivations, and the consequences—this piece somewhat removed from the actual subject—all allowing me a fuller picture of the man Sadat, his death, and his legacy. I used this information to create a more accurate picture of Sadat and the connection of his life to my fuller topic, the Israeli-Egyptian conflict.
Online Books


This source gave incredible insight into the original circumstances surrounding the force of Zionism. Herzl’s book was the primary spark for the Zionist movement, and, thus, reading his views was extremely helpful in more fully understanding the true circumstances surrounding the birth of Zionism. Also, this document helped me better understand the nature of the Zionist argument from the days of its birth, rather than its interpretation in the modern world.

Images


I used this particular image within my appendix. This is an image of the historic signing of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, displaying Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and American President Jimmy Carter.


I used this particular image within my appendix. This is an image of the Balfour Declaration, issued by the British government toward the end of World War I.


I used this particular image within my appendix. This image is of a document announcing the United States’ recognition of Israel as a sovereign political entity.


I used this particular image within my appendix. This is an image of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) official vacating the Sinai Peninsula following former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s request for their evacuation.


I used this particular image within my appendix. This is an image of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat speaking before the Israeli Knesset, or national legislative assembly.

Egypt’s War For Peace

I used this particular image within my appendix. This popular image is of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Secondary Sources

Interviews

Rizk, Khaled Youssri. Personal Interview by author. 7 August 2007.
Khaled Youssri Rizk is currently the Deputy Consul General of the Egyptian Consulate of Houston, which serves the Southwest United States. The interview with Mr. Rizk provided me with knowledge only accessible through a dignitary, and the Deputy Consul’s perspective on the Middle East—past and present—was very helpful. Mr. Rizk provided me with information regarding former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and his part in the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, signed in 1979. He was also able to provide the feelings of the people of Egypt at the time of the signing of that precedential document and their current feelings toward their Jewish neighbors. Finally, Mr. Rizk helped me understand the nature of relations between Israel and Egypt, as well as Egypt’s relations with its Arab neighbors and the United States.

Ross, Dennis. Personal Interview by author. 6 September 2007.
Ambassador Dennis Ross was an incomparable source in the area of Middle Eastern affairs because of his background in that field. Ambassador Ross graduated from UCLA in 1970 and served briefly as the head of the Berkeley-Stanford program on Soviet-International Behavior. Under President Ronald Reagan, Ambassador Ross served as director of Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council staff and as Deputy Director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment. During the Presidency of George H.W. Bush, Ambassador Ross served as Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, where he played a leading role in determining U.S. policy toward the former Soviet Union and developing the 1991 Gulf War coalition. Under George H.W. Bush, and later President Bill Clinton, Ambassador Ross was the United States’ point man on the Middle East peace process. Under President Clinton, he was indispensable in facilitating the 1995 Interim Agreement for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty and the 1997 Hebron Accord. Ambassador Ross also worked to conciliate relations between Israel and Syria. Ambassador Ross was awarded the Presidential Medal for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service by President Clinton, and Secretaries of State James Baker and Madeleine Albright presented him with the State Department’s highest honor, the Secretary’s Distinguished Service Award. Ambassador Ross is currently The Washington Institute’s Counselor and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow. He has received honorary degrees from Amherst, Jewish Theological Seminary, and Syracuse University. Ambassador Ross has also written extensively on the Middle East peace process. My interview with Ambassador Ross was an indispensable tool in my research because his unrivaled insight into the Middle East peace process, particularly in the past two decades, allowed me to better understand the political and diplomatic climate pervasive in the Middle East. Ambassador Ross was also able to provide me with insight into U.S. actions that I would otherwise have unable to attain.

Professor Richard Stoll is a professor of Political Science at Rice University, Hous-
ton, Texas, and also the Associate Dean of Social Sciences there. Holding a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Michigan, he is an accomplished scholar of international conflict and has recently worked on multi-university studies to collect data regarding international conflict and conflict prediction, a study funded by the National Science Foundation. He is also the winner of multiple prestigious teaching awards at Rice University and a member of the Council of the Correlates of War Project. Professor Stall’s viewpoint on the history and current politics of the Middle East as a political scientist were extremely helpful and insightful. He was able to provide an interesting perspective on my topic and give an objective view of the situation—past and present. His use of political concepts, governmental theories, and military strategy gave me a new lens through which to view my research and revealed a new facet of my topic. It was interesting to see how the actions of the countries in the Middle East are useful for the political scientist, and that knowledge has given me a new approach to my research. Also, that new lens has assisted my objectivity in researching.

Zamir, Gillian. Personal Interview by author. 15 July 2007.
Gillian Zamir is a student from Israel who, during his summer stay in America, was willing to speak to me. Mr. Zamir, as a young man, gave me a unique perspective on the State of Israel from a youth’s perspective. He was able to describe the view of Israel that young men and women there possess, founded on future expectations and past struggles. His grandfather fought in the Six-Day War and so his recollections of the matter and emotions regarding it were a fascinating insight into the national pride of Israelis regarding their state. He also provided an insight, as a civilian, into military actions and the view of the world press regarding Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Zamir, Zoly. Personal Interview by author. 8 August 2007.
Mr. Zamir was formerly a doorman at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem where he witnessed the birth and growth of Israel in interaction with some of the greatest figures of Israeli history, among them the nation’s “founding father,” David Ben-Gurion. With this incredible history in the Israeli state, Mr. Zamir was a fantastic source who was not only able to provide fascinating historical information on the events of Israeli history but also anecdotes and stories that served to reinforce his information. Moreover, the perspective Mr. Zamir offered as someone who had witnessed the birth of that nation provided him with a fascinating view of the future, grounded in historical precedent. Mr. Zamir’s infectious passion for the subject of Israel was evident throughout our interview and served to enrich his recollections.

Mrs. Belaynesh Zevadia is currently the Deputy Consul General of Israel to the Southwest United States, and previously held the position of Consul General of Israel to the Midwest United States. She has been on the Israeli envoy to the United Nations and is the first Ethiopian woman to serve in the Israeli Diplomatic Service. Our interview was enlightening, and she provided a great quantity of information regarding Israel’s position in the world—diplomatically, economically, scientifically, and militarily. She was able to provide information from a diplomat’s point of view and that perspective was invaluable. I was able to glean excellent information on Israel’s state of affairs, both domestic and international, during the time of the Six-Day War as well as their current state of affairs in both arenas. The interviewee provided good information, specifically, on Israel’s current relationships with foreign nations, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and the United States.
Egypt’s War For Peace

Books


The Insight Team of the London Sunday Times compiled this work in a concentrated effort to form a comprehensive work of the October 1973 War (or Yom Kippur War) founded upon the original reporting of its members throughout the crisis. This source was extremely helpful in gathering information on all aspects of the October 1973 War, particularly the peace efforts that immediately followed. The source does not cover the peace agreement that was formed years following the event. However, the Ultimate perspective of the source allowed me better insight into the event and its immediate aftermath.


This was one of my main sources. It lent me extremely valuable information about the Six-Day War and provided a comprehensive, detailed account about that conflict. From this book I gained information about the June 1967 conflict in its historical context and was able to explore the numerous events that led up to it. Oren’s work also lent me insight into the political machinations from the birth of the State of Israel to the Six-Day War that permeated the area, specifically the complex political relations of the Arab states in the region. It also provided a thorough detailing of the part the United States and the former United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) played in the tensions of the Middle East.


This book was primarily used for insight into Zionism and its effects on the Israeli State. The book provided an in-depth, scholarly look at the circumstances that have influenced the world’s Jews for hundreds of years and spurred them to create an independent nation. It also examined the laws and circumstances that are at work within the State of Israel today. Each of these helped me better understand the historical and present situations of Jewish life.


This book was a fascinating, primarily pictorial, account of story of Israel’s history. Written in the form of a newspaper, it provided me with background information for the influential leaders in Israeli history—Prime Ministers and Presidents, for instance—as well as week-by-week accounts of the major Israeli conflicts. The book also details important events in Israeli history through 1998, thus allowing the reader to see the long-term impact of earlier Israeli events, such as the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt.

Internet Websites


This article was very important in helping me understand the larger impact that the year 1967 has had on today’s world. Not only was it a landmark time in organized
military conflict and escalated tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors, but it was also a time of a great change in Islamic religious thought. The article helped me understand the greater effect of 1967 on our world today, and that impact is clear in the religious extremism that has had a huge impact on our society today.


Fouad Ajami is a noted Middle Eastern scholar, and this article was invaluable insight from one who has passionately studied the Middle East and its conflicts for many years. The article helped me gain information regarding the June 1967 War’s catalysts, particularly the faulty Soviet intelligence that spurred Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to order his massive troop movement into the Sinai. This single piece of the larger puzzle was crucial in creating the context for the six-day conflict.


The British occupation of Egypt was a shaping event in the nation’s millennia-long history and heavily contributed to the country’s attitudes and direction after independence. This influence was clearly seen in Egyptian attitudes toward Israel. This site helped me better understand the complex history that influenced Egypt and shaped its attitudes in the conflicts of the later 20th century.


Golda Meir was a premiere figure in Egyptian-Israeli relations, shaping relations following the June 1967 War and October 1973 War. Prime Minister preceding Menachem Begin, Meir’s influence remained strong during Begin’s term. This site gave me background information on her and helped me interpret her influence on Israeli politics.


This webpage is primarily devoted to biographical information for former United States Ambassador Dennis Ross, whose lecture I was privileged to attend and whom I also had the privilege to interview. However, within the biographical information, dates pertinent to Israeli peace agreements are also noted. This website, then, was important in providing for me information on a man I was honored to meet as well as information on events that have been vital to the diplomatic history of the State of Israel.


This article helped me understand the complex relationship between Great Britain and Egypt and the independence process that stretched from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, largely as a result of continued British interest in Egypt and its strategic assets. The history behind Egypt’s independence was important to understand because of its continuing influence on later Egyptian involvement in Middle Eastern relations.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, perhaps as much as anyone else, shaped the modern Middle East and was a catalyzing figure in the conflict that erupted in the Middle East. A striking contrast to his successor, Anwar Sadat, Nasser led Egypt (privately and publically) from 1952 to his death in 1970. This source gave me extensive background information on this dynamic leader and the important accomplishments of his life. Particularly important from this source was Nasser’s creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, seen as a momentous achievement through the lens of Pan-Arabism.


Peter L. Hahn is a professor of diplomatic history at Ohio State University and is executive director of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. He has specialized in U.S. diplomatic history in the Middle East since 1940. This article analyzes the origins, events, and consequences of the Suez Crisis that was pivotal to Middle Eastern relations after 1956. This event was a catalyst for tensions that would arise later, so understanding its importance was imperative to my research and analysis of my research.


Britain’s place in the conflict that arose in the Middle East was undeniable. This source gave me important information about the involvement of the British and, more particularly, their stake in this specific area of land. The importance of this area was important to the British for military and economic reasons, thus fueling their involvement in the area’s development.


This source was helpful in procuring information about Israel’s “War of Independence,” as that fledgling nation called it. The days immediately following the birth of the Israeli state were filled with conflict as the Arab nations and Israel went to war. The conflicts of that violence were extremely important in the subsequent years and had lasting effects, still vivid as the June 1967 war began.


In this article, Charles Krauthammer explores the various difficulties that the State of Israel has had to endure during its conflicted life. This article is a celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of Israel’s establishment. Krauthammer also states what must be accomplished to provide peace for the Middle East. This article provided me with the view of Arab-Israeli relations from a staunch supporter of Israel. However, Mr. Krau-
thammer’s scholarship on this subject also allows it to be a carefully reasoned article on the difficulties Israel has faced and the prospects of future peace in the area.


This article was extremely valuable in helping me understand the emotion surrounding the initial attack of Israel on Egypt. It helped me better feel the tension that inundated the State of Israel and the fear that permeated the event. This helped me better communicate those emotions in my paper. This was the article that first spurred my interest in Arab-Israeli relations.


This site gave extensive biographical information on former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who was instrumental in developing the peace treaty that pacified Egyptian-Israeli relations in 1979. Understanding his background was crucial to forming an accurate assessment of his actions and comprehension of the man himself.


This article was extremely helpful in exploring the primary causes of the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, as well as its impact since that time. The treaty was a moment of monumental importance in history that came after much prolonged, bloody conflict. The reasons for the treaty, then, were numerous and complex, but a lasting peace between nations was, of course, the ultimate goal. This article also helped me learn about the effects of the treaty, ultimately if peace between Israel and Egypt has truly lasted and how important that has been in global relations and diplomacy.


In this article, Dennis Prager gives a brief overview of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He also explores potential resolutions to that conflict and past events that failed to procure peace. Finally, he analyzes the mindset of the Arab and Israeli parties in the conflict. This article gave me further insight into the true roots of the conflict: the ideologies—and, frequently, prejudices—that pervade the Arab and Israeli camps. It is the transcendence of these suspicions that will enable peace. This was important to understanding the potential for peace in the Middle East.


Revisionist Zionism is a branch of Zionism that seeks the settlement of Biblical Israel, which includes the West Bank and parts of Jordan. Because this was the form of Zionism that Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, endorsed, it was vital that I understand it. This website provided a satisfactory definition of the political philosophy.
Egypt’s War For Peace


United Nations Security Resolution 242 was the landmark effort at peace that immediately followed the June 1967 (or Six Days) War. The United Nations strove for peace throughout the Middle East as this event unfolded, this resolution being the finalization of those efforts. Resolution 242 remains an important historical document, as well as an in-effect resolution, though true international peace was not reached until the 1979 agreement between Israel and Egypt. This document, however, formed the foundation of peace talks between the conflicted nations and represents the opinion of the international community toward the conflict of the Middle East.


Anwar Sadat has influenced Middle Eastern politics and diplomacy in a way that virtually no other leader in that region has. This article helped me learn more, in general, about his influential leadership. More specifically, it allowed me to assess the transformations Egypt underwent as a result of the October 1973 war. In this war, Egypt was able to regain the honor and dignity it had lost six years previous and negotiate with Israel for peace as a nation of equal stature. This was crucial in the entire peace process, and this article reinforced that principal consequence of the conflict.


Though this article primarily explores the current state of Middle Eastern affairs, it effectively related past events to those of the modern world. Particularly interesting was the quote from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser that asserted his feelings toward regaining the Sinai Peninsula through diplomatic relations following the June 1967, or Six Days, War. This remark gives insight into Nasser’s character and attitude toward Egyptian pride and international negotiation.


This webpage was devoted to the 1997 Hebron Accord that marks another of the predominant agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. This site provided me with the history of the accord and the necessary circumstances from which it developed. It helped me, also, to better understand Israel’s activities in peacemaking throughout the Middle East, particularly in the complex situation involving the Palestinians.

Videos


This production was a brief, yet interesting, look into the life of Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt from 1954-1970. It helped me better understand the enigmatic leader whose decisions and leadership were crucial aspects of the Israeli-Arab conflict during and after his presidency. This video helped me understand the influence Nasser pos-
sessed over the people of Egypt (tens of thousands mourned in the streets at Nasser’s funeral, and forty died in the procession) and his influence over foreign leaders (he briefly united much of the Arab world in the United Arab Empire). These accomplishments and his personality traits—both good and bad noted in the film—made him a powerful leader in the now-Middle East, and this film helped me more fully realize his impact. It helped me better capture the figure of Nasser in my final work.

Images


I used this particular image within my appendix. This image is of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who preceded aforementioned Anwar Sadat.


I used this particular image within my appendix. This image is of the United Nations’ proposed partition plan for Palestine, proposed in 1947. The proposed plan would have created a Jewish and Palestinian state within Palestine. The plan was ultimately rejected.


I used this image within my appendix. This image is of the territory alterations following the June 1967, or Six Days, War. Following the war, Israel had captured significant quantities of Arab land.


I used this image within my appendix. This image displays the routes of invasion of the Arab states immediately following the declaration of Israel’s statehood by the United Nations in May 1948.


I used this image within my appendix. This image displays modern Egypt and, particularly important within my research, its numerous waterways that were sources of conflict in Egyptian-Israeli relations.
Appendix A

Foreign Office,
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

[Signature]

Balfour Declaration, 2 Nov 1917
Appendix B

General Assembly Plan of Partition
With Economic Union, 1947

- The proposed Jewish State
- The proposed Arab State
- Jerusalem and its suburbs to be an international zone
Appendix C: Declaration of Israeli Statehood

This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the Government thereof.

The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel.

 Approved May 14, 1948.

[Signature]
Appendix D
Appendix E: Gamal Abdel Nasser
Appendix F

Appendix G: UNEF Troop Removal
Today we have a chance to prove the fact. We have, indeed, a chance to make the world see matters in their true perspective. We are now face to face with Israel. In recent days Israel has been making threats of aggression and it has been boasting. On 13 May a very important statement was made. Anyone reading this statement must believe that these people are so brutal and brutal that one simply cannot remain silent. The statement said that the Israelis said they would carry out their military operations against Syria in order to occupy Damascus and overthrow the Syrian Government. On the same day, Israeli Premier Eshkol made a strongly threatening statement against Syria. At the same time the communists said that Israel believed Egypt could not make a move because it was bogged down in Yemen. Of course they say that we are bogged down in Yemen and have problems there. We are in Yemen, but they seem to believe the lies they have been saying all these years about our existence in Yemen. It is also possible that the Israelis believe such lies. We are incapable of bearing our duties in Yemen and at the same time doing our national duty here in Egypt in defending our borders and in attacking if Israel attacks any Arab country.

On 13 May we received accurate information that Israel was concentrating on the Syrian border near the forces of about 9,000 Israeli forces, and the other arm of the Lake Lisan, and the other north of the lake. The decision made by Israel at this time was to carry out an aggression against Syria at 21 May. On 14 May we took our measures, discussed the matter, and contacted our Syrians brothers in the Syrian areas. The Syrians also had this information. We have not in fact given our Israeli brothers any information. We told them that we had decided that if Syria was attacked, Egypt would order the battle from the first minute. This was the situation in May. The forces began to move in the direction of Jism to take up normal positions. An agreement reported yesterday that those military operations must have been the result of a previously well-laid plan. And I say that the sequence of events determined the plan. We had no plan before 13 May, because we believed that Israel would not dare attack any Arab country and that Israel would not have dared to make such an important statement.

On 16 May we requested the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNIF) from the UAR. We then requested the complete withdrawal of UNIF. A big world-wide campaign, led by the United States, Britain, and Canada began opposing the withdrawal of UNIF from Egypt. Thus we felt that there were attempts to turn UNIF into a force serving imperialism. It is obvious that UNIF protected Egypt with our approval and therefore cannot continue to stay in Egypt except with our approval. Until yesterday, a great deal was said about UNIF. A campaign is still being mounted against the U.N. Secretary-General, because he made a difficult and honest decision and could not surrender to the pressure brought to bear upon him by the United States, Britain, and Canada to make UNIF an instrument for implementing imperialism's plans.

It is quite natural—and I say this quite frankly—that had UNIF imposed its basic mission and turned to achieving the aims of imperialism, we would have regarded it as a useless force and promptly dismissed it. We are definitely capable of doing such a job. I say this now not to discredit the UNIF but to those who have anti-imperialist ideas and who want the United Nations to achieve their aims. There is not a single nation which truly respects itself and enjoys full sovereignty which could accept these methods in any form.
Appendix H
Appendix I: Anwar El-Sadat

Appendix J: Sadat at the Knesset
Appendix K: Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty
**The History Teacher**

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*The History Teacher* (ISSN: 0018-2745), currently in its 45th Volume and published quarterly, is an informative and inspirational journal with peer-reviewed articles addressing historical and pedagogical issues in primary, secondary, and higher education classrooms. The journal also features reviews of historical monographs, textbooks, films, websites, and other multimedia.

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