Dialogues on the Experience of War: Using History and Student-Led Discussion Groups to Explore the Nature of Military Service

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Because the United States military is likely to continue its increased operational tempo for the foreseeable future, the number of servicemembers who will leave the armed forces to pursue academic degrees will also continue at record levels. According to one study, “Two million veterans are poised to enter higher education.”¹ Many of these arriving student veterans will have had multiple overseas and/or combat deployments during their enlistments. On average, they will arrive on campuses having life experiences markedly different from those of their civilian counterparts. Student veterans are likely to be more mature, focused on quickly finishing their academic programs—overwhelmingly in the professional disciplines—and unlikely to fully engage the larger college community than are civilian students.² The bifurcation between veterans and civilians is mirrored in general society as well. Because of the nature of the wars we are fighting with an all-volunteer professional military, the effects of warfighting and deployments are felt on servicemembers and their immediate families. As retired Lieutenant General David Barno and Dr. Nora
Bensahel observe, “Starting a meaningful conservation with these veterans of our current wars remains extraordinarily difficult for the vast majority of Americans who have no association with the military.”3 Undoubtedly, the long-term effects of this alienation is detrimental to our society, but, fortunately, the arrival of student veterans also presents an opportunity to bridge this gap.

In particular, the study of history—its scope, reliance on analytical narrative, and methodology of tracing change and continuity over time—provides for an exchange of meaningful narratives. As historians Martha Howell and Walter Prevenier argue, “All cultures, all peoples, tell stories about themselves, and it is these stories that help provide meanings that make a culture. In its most basic sense, this is what history is: the stories we tell about our prior selves.”4 This insight provided the basis for a unique service-related, upper-level history seminar that my colleague, Dr. Carolyn Vacca, and I offered in the spring semester of 2018 for the veteran and civilian students at our liberal arts college, St. John Fisher College in Rochester, New York.

A grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) special project, Dialogues on the Experience of War, funded the course, the purpose of which is to foster “the study and discussion of important humanities sources about war, in the belief that these sources can help U.S. military veterans and others think more deeply about the issues raised by war and military service.”5 The NEH required that the grant recipients compare military service in at least one war prior to World War II with at least one in a subsequent conflict, and then hold dialogues with veterans from outside the institutions on the nature of military service, using those conflicts as the basis of the comparison. In our dialogue, we used World War I (1914-1918) and the counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq (2001-2015) because, through these conflicts, we could compare the modern industrialized warfare of the last century with arguably the first postmodern conflict in the twenty-first century.6

The first step in the planning phase of the course was to broadly define a student veteran, and we included reservists and National Guard members, because we have more of these servicemembers in our region than those who have finished active military service. Then, to maximize the participation of those student veterans, we met with the college’s Veterans Club to determine how the
course might address the veterans at our school. The members who responded told us that they needed a liberal arts core credit and thought a weekly afternoon or evening class would best accommodate their family obligations and work schedules. They also agreed that the format of our proposed dialogues—student-led, small-group discussions at off-campus locations with older veterans—would be a strong draw for student veterans.

To facilitate learning, we utilized online and classroom components, primary and secondary text sources, and historical films and images. The course was not intended to provide an in-depth analysis of historical methodology or of the wars, per se, but instead was to be a vehicle for exploring military service. This approach helped the student veterans and the civilian students to understand warfare at an individual level and within larger contexts. As historian Peter Stearns states:

"Studying the stories of individuals and situations in the past allows a student of history to test his or her own moral sense, to hone it against some of the real complexities individuals have faced in difficult settings. People who have weathered adversity not just in some work of fiction, but in real, historical circumstances can provide inspiration."

The historical component of the course connected the participants to each other’s contextualized experiences, thereby making the college experience more approachable for veterans.

The historical content proved helpful in a programmatic manner. Because the course was comparative and concerned practical and theoretical aspects of military service over time, we included a section on military ethics based on the individualized experiences of soldiers. This approach placed the seminar within the college’s religious and philosophical core area of study, a designation that particularly attracted transfer students. In fact, many student veterans at our college transfer from two-year community colleges without a broad enough background in the necessary religious and philosophical core area required by our college. Furthermore, because the student veterans tend to overwhelmingly favor professional schools, they usually lack exposure to history courses, as these are not required. Therefore, obtaining the core designation for the history seminar helped us attract veterans who were either in need of a degree requirement or who might have found our
particular course useful in meeting their academic goals while also being intellectually interesting. The core designation attracted regular undergraduates for similar reasons, although several of these students desired to understand the military experiences of a close family member or friend. Finally, the structure of the seminar, which resembled a dialogue setting, also aligned with the type of small-unit, military-style education familiar to student veterans.

A total of sixteen students enrolled over the spring semester and following summer session, including four combat veterans, each of whom had either one or two overseas tours, and one who had been wounded in combat. Students were either juniors or seniors in the schools of business, education, or arts and sciences, but none of the student veterans were history majors. Finally, two students in the spring course—a civilian in the school of education and a combat veteran in the school of business—continued in the summer as interns helping to coordinate site visits.

The dialogues were scheduled at various assisted living facilities and relied on the assistance of site coordinators to identify resident veterans who were willing and capable of participating in a discussion. The students conducted on-site discussions without the instructors. Most of the community residents who participated were male veterans of the Vietnam War and the Korean War, and a few were veterans of World War II. Two were female: one was a former nurse, and the other was an enlisted member of the Naval Reserves for Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES). Most had wartime experience, although not in combat. Thus, they had different experiences in military service, and they came from a variety of military occupational specialties and ranks. Each discussion group consisted of between four and twelve community veterans, with approximately eighty veterans overall. Based on the feedback provided by the facilities, there was universal support for further dialogues, as well as the desire to continue the program. Mainly because of this response, we offered the course again during the following summer term.

In the first ten weeks of the course, the students analyzed the materials to develop general discussion points for use in the dialogue, conducted mock dialogues for practice, and refined their discussion points among themselves. The sources included letters, memoirs, period films, expositions, and official military documents. In their
on-site discussion sessions, some students circulated summaries of materials used in the seminar. The group discussions began with the participants completing a brief voluntary questionnaire comprised of three general questions, which was distributed to the community veterans to gage their levels of prior self-reflection on military service. According to Barno and Bensahel, veterans should not be asked questions that force them to relive a “searing experience.”\textsuperscript{13} To respect the participants’ privacy, and to avoid potential issues, the students did not keep notes, nor ask intimate personal questions. For similar reasons, the details of the on-site dialogues are not published in this article.

**Historical and Contemporary Sources Related to Military Service**

Dr. Vacca covered the methodology of oral history and textual analysis with the students. She concentrated on visual and personal letters related to service on the Western Front in World War I. My focus was on the evolution of military ethics and the historical emergence of modern military strategy and contemporary counterinsurgency warfare. The subject matter was particularly challenging because, although some of the veterans had fought in Afghanistan or Iraq and therefore possessed experiential knowledge, they lacked a theoretical approach to analyzing and understanding this knowledge.\textsuperscript{14} I chose to use translated primary sources related to ethics and strategy: the process of identifying appropriate ends and means, which is the basis of Aristotelian ethics, and the wider strategic concepts of meeting the goals and ends of military force.

The foundational historical texts included excerpts from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*, and C. E. Callwell’s *Small Wars*. On more contemporary topics, we consulted Counterinsurgency Doctrine (COIN), reviewed recent developments in military service, and read two wartime memoirs on Afghanistan and Iraq: Patrick K. O’Donnell’s *We Were One: Shoulder to Shoulder with the Marines who took Fallujah* and Sean Parnell’s *Outlaw Platoon: Heroes, Renegades, Infidels, and the Brotherhood of War in Afghanistan*. These sources blended both scholarly and experiential understandings.\textsuperscript{15}
Aristotle

Aristotle did not extensively address military service in his main ethical writings, but I found his work relevant in helping students to contextualize military service. An ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle established a systematic process of ethics formation that aligns proper ends with appropriate means, articulated the importance of the key military virtue of courage, and developed the motivation for military service. Similarly, noted military ethicist Mark Jensen stated, “The chief good for the soldier is found in the good of the state, while the military itself plays a specific role in sustaining that good.” Thus, military service is grounded in defending the common good. It requires courage because rashness is foolhardiness, while its absence is cowardice. Discipline is required to give direction to courage. To act ethically, a soldier must deliberate over the proper action; avoid emotional responses, as well as those based on ignorance or compulsion; and then act according to directives, accomplish missions, and maintain troop welfare. Finally, politics is part of—or, as one writer put it, ancillary—to Aristotle’s ethics: “Given the identification of human good achieved by the latter [ethics], political theory narrowly conceived seeks to identify which forms of society are more and which less conducive to the achievement of that good.”

Clausewitz

Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz’s work is also critical because it was the foundation of modern military strategy. Clausewitz participated in the Napoleonic Wars, served in the Prussian and Russian militaries, and won several battlefield victories. However, he questioned why the Coalition never could turn these successes into lasting political objectives, especially in the early stages of the war. Educated in philosophy, mathematics, and history at the War Academy in Berlin, and drawing on his military experiences, Clausewitz examined warfare from both theoretical and pragmatic perspectives, seeing it as a broad human undertaking. In On War (published in 1932 after his death), he explored how the eternal elements of war such as courage, uncertainty (i.e., “the fog of war”), fear, chance, and friction (i.e.,
its physical dangers) interacted with the “modern” influences of economic, social, and cultural factors. He believed that modern warfare required an achievable political goal and could not just rely on battlefield victory to measure success. Similarly, he saw war was a profoundly social and not scientific endeavor. Moreover, because human behavior is fluid and situational, any “absolute, so-called mathematical factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry.”

War is composed of primordial violence, chance, and policy. The last aspect restrains the violence unleashed by fighting because policy directs organized violence towards an objective and prevents the outbreak of absolute war. Specifically, a prudent goal established by reason (i.e., the understanding of a good end) and implemented such that it prevents war from becoming mindless violence is vital to military service and strategy. However, policy does not direct military operations—soldiers do. Hence, the execution of an informed military strategy requires the development and utilization of the martial characteristics of an army’s society. By Clausewitz’s measure, the soldier is a professional who executes the state’s national strategy as expressed in the military’s war plan, but in a manner that fulfills his mission and achieves the steps needed to break the will of his enemy.

Callwell

Colonel Charles Edward Callwell began his military career as a junior British artillery officer during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, and later participated in the Second Anglo-Boer War. In these conflicts, the British campaigned against indigenous enemies, who used the advantage of local terrain, climate, and mobility to inflict heavy casualties on a technologically superior regular military force. Callwell became concerned about preparing regular armies to fight in a type of war different from what they were used to in Europe. Such a conflict, fought in remote areas between regulars and irregulars, he termed a “small war,” which he believed required different methods of fighting. At the very least, geography would prove a far more difficult obstacle to overcome than it had been in
Europe. Likewise, regulars would have to become operationally lighter and faster, while retaining overwhelming firepower, if they hoped to permanently defeat irregular foes. The military would also have to rely more on the use of friendly indigenous auxiliaries and guides. Operational strategy in a small war was to concentrate the irregular enemy in a decisive engagement, where the regulars’ firepower would overcome the irregulars’ mobility. Military strategists thus sought to pressure those factors that their indigenous foes valued and so defeat them in such an overwhelming manner that they give up on the idea of revenge and further resistance and accept the new political order.

Regular soldiers thus needed to be not only bold and aggressive, but also focused on and mindful of attaining operational, intermediary, and long-term strategic goals. National command authorities usually handled the strategic goals of regular warfare, whereas in small wars, such concerns were directly shaped by junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and imperial officials in the immediate vicinity. Callwell cautioned every level of command against undertaking military operations without having a clear objective in mind: “Every undertaking should have a definite and distinct purpose, and once entered upon should be carried out to the end unless some insuperable objection unexpectedly arises.”

**Counterinsurgency Doctrine (COIN)**

In the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States military has dramatically shifted from preparing to fight a modern enemy state to defeating insurgencies. As a result, it has adopted an updated version of counterinsurgency warfare. The necessary change in doctrine commenced with the experiences of officers whose careers had started in the security operations of the 1990s, specifically in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. While overall strategic planning through the early 2000s was still largely shaped by the assumptions of the Cold War and the experience of the Gulf War post-9/11, a transition in thinking toward the concept of a contemporary small war seemed imminent. As the Sunni insurgency in Iraq developed and sectarian violence worsened, Lt. General David Petraeus and Lt. General James Mattis developed the Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency (COIN) manual largely in response to the
deteriorating security situation in coalition-occupied Iraq. Many operational concepts that were developed during 2003 and 2004 were incorporated into the new doctrine, such as providing security to host nation populations, working with non-governmental organizations and other agencies to comprehensively eliminate the conditions that had created the insurgency, rebuilding the legitimacy of the host government, and considering how moral and ethical considerations affect the outcome of these political goals. Counterinsurgency required more than a military campaign: it needed the “unity of effort by civil authorities, intelligence agencies, and security forces.” Such unity meant a distinctly political outcome that would convince the population that whatever form the new Iraqi government took, it was legitimate or would at least provide long-term security.

In addition, COIN calls for moral reasoning, specifically because to be successful, counterinsurgency forces must understand the origins of the insurgency, how it functions, and its membership and social structure in considering the best way to dismantle it using either coercion and/or persuasion in the context of political factors and restrictions. These are moral, ethical, and political considerations because “Army and Marine Corps leaders are expected to act ethically and in accordance with shared national values and Constitutional principles, which are reflected in the law and military oaths of service.” This type of warfare challenges the tech-heavy, top-to-bottom military institution developed since World War II. COIN requires ethical formulations in military operations because the influence of individual soldiers is more apparent than in the large industrial battlefields of previous wars.

Military leaders and regular servicemembers must “work proactively to establish and maintain the proper ethical climate of their organizations” to ensure that soldiers and Marines “remain faithful to basic American, Army, and Marine Corps standards of proper behavior and respect for the sanctity of life.” These are done not only for the pragmatic reason of ending the insurgency, but also for the largely political goal of establishing and maintaining political legitimacy. The ability of servicemembers to function in the absence of direct supervision by superior officers, in an unfamiliar cultural context under harsh environmental conditions, is critical in COIN. Accordingly, military preparations must include cultural and ethical training that “addresses many possible scenarios of the
COIN environment. Education should prepare Soldiers and Marines to deal with the unexpected and unknown.”31 This is especially true of junior and mid-level non-commissioned officers, who must possess good judgment and tactical competency because of the “decentralized nature of operations.”32

Experience of Military Service

Since 1973, the United States has had an all-volunteer force, which means that the country possesses a professional military that is often smaller than the conscript militaries of earlier periods, is deployed more frequently for longer periods of time, and must rely on integrating reserve and National Guard forces. While recruitment is important in both the regular and reserve components, the latter units are recruited from the regions of the country where they will serve. Thus, the activation and deployment of reservists and guardsmen directly affects communities. Moreover, these servicemembers tend to be slightly older, healthier, and better educated than were earlier generations of conscripted soldiers. Hence, a volunteer force has more civilian dependents than previous militaries, and it tends to remain outside regular civilian society for longer periods of time.33

Therefore, most of the military personnel fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect a demographic different from those who fought in World War II, Korea, or Vietnam. A second observation is that the largest share of combat in the current war is borne by the United States Army and Marines. However, the support-heavy nature of the modern military means most deployed military forces are not conducting direct combat missions. Instead, they serve in logistic and supply roles, although, unlike in previous conflicts, the nature of a counterinsurgency renders “frontline service” somewhat meaningless. While the nature of combat remains brutal, the types of operations differ from those of earlier conflicts because large maneuver elements are not normally used in COIN operations. Most ground-combat servicemembers are assigned to smaller units in forward operating bases (FOBs) established throughout an area of operation, while most support personnel are in the larger bases. Hence, actual experiences vary greatly according to the soldier’s military occupational specialty, where the service took place, and the mission of the soldier’s unit.
Military deployments are difficult, regardless of where the servicemember serves. The fact remains that the counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq are located in regions with harsh environments and geographies under incredibly stressful, emotionally draining, and dangerous conditions. Working with host and coalition forces requires learning about various cultural, social, and political factors, not to mention the danger of so-called “green-on-green” engagements between friendly and allied forces, or insurgents disguised as friendly forces, ambushing coalition soldiers. United States military personnel must also relate to culturally diverse indigenous populations that might be resentful of a foreign presence in their country. Junior-ranking servicemembers might interact with representatives of non-governmental organizations, members of the media, or civilian and military contractors. Because digital communication is ubiquitous, news of military misconduct or misbehavior can easily spread beyond the area of operation and affect the politics of the counterinsurgency.

Likewise, problems at home can be instantly communicated to deployed servicemembers, thereby affecting both individual and unit morale. Leaders at all levels of the chain of command must be aware that domestic problems thousands of miles away could affect deployed servicemembers. In terms of kinetic operations, insurgencies are hybrid wars that are particularly difficult to fight because of their unconventional nature, particularly when they involve terrorism, indiscriminate bombings/Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and corrupt or ineffective host-government allies. The dynamic nature of the insurgent force’s structure, weapons, and tactics often demands that counterinsurgents be operational and strategically adaptable. The personnel in combat operations must also ensure an operations tempo that neither exhausts service personnel nor keeps them confined to FOBs for fear of suffering casualties.

Military operations tend to adopt their own pacing throughout the preparation, conduct, and post-operation phases. Fighting tends to be focused on specific locales and spots, including intensive close combat and personal violence. Finally, advanced medical, transportation, and communication technologies usually mean that United States forces suffer more “wounded in action,” including both physical injuries and post-traumatic stress disorders, but they are less likely to be killed in action.34
Memoir: Patrick K. O’Donnell

In *We Were One: Shoulder to Shoulder with the Marines Who Took Fallujah*, Patrick O’Donnell chronicles the intense fighting in Iraq, where he was embedded as a historian with Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines during the Second Battle of Fallujah. The fighting was fierce because the city was the insurgents’ center of gravity and, thus, coalition strategists targeted it to force the insurgents into a major battle. Sergeants and corporals led their Marines through heavily defended and booby-trapped buildings against an entrenched, determined enemy. Fighting in an urban environment is violent and largely negates any technological advantage that the Marines possessed. According to O’Donnell, “Clearing buildings is combat at its most primitive. The fighting is up close and personal, not the pushbutton warfare that many Americans hear about and see on television.” It was obvious the Marines inflicted heavy casualties, but the insurgents’ strategy was to kill as many Marines as possible during the battle. Regarding the insurgents, one Marine told O’Donnell, “Their discipline throughout the battle still amazes me…their goal was to kill an American and then die.” After systematically clearing most of the insurgents’ positions, the Marines finally decided to simply bulldoze the remainder of the enemy-occupied buildings, and turned control over the city to Iraqi forces. The operation convinced local Sunni leaders to back the government against foreign insurgents.

Memoir: Sean Parnell (with John R. Bruning)

In *Outlaw Platoon: Heroes, Renegades, Infidels, and the Brotherhood of War in Afghanistan*, Sean Parnell’s memoir about his service in Afghanistan as a platoon commander from February 2006 to January 2007, he relates that on his first day at an FOB, he came under mortar attack. Afterwards, the soldiers received reports that a group of Afghani children and their parents, who were just outside the FOB, were wounded in the attack. Parnell and the others responded with the intention of evacuating the children to the base’s medical center. At that point, however, the fathers demanded that the boys be treated before the girls because, as Parnell was told by his interpreter, in Afghanistan society, male children are valued above
females. Parnell and the Americans refused and instead brought all the children in for treatment, even though the young girl Parnell was trying to save died in his arms on the way to the medical station.37

In another case, Parnell was walking through a village that had been wiped out by a Soviet air raid during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which indicated that the mindless devastation had likely only increased the local opposition to the Soviets. Over the course of his deployment, Parnell remarked that the war in Afghanistan was not one in which enemies and allies were clearly defined and there was no clear distinction between the two as there had been in other wars. In another instance, his platoon had cleared a Taliban position only to find that the enemy had received medicines from Pakistani hospitals, although Pakistan was ostensibly a coalition ally. Later, he learned that the hospitals were providing sanctuary for wounded insurgents, which led him to observe, “What an odd situation—our wounded enemy recovering in our erstwhile ‘ally’s’ medical system. What would folks have thought if the German wounded had recovered in London hospitals in 1944, only to return to the battlefield?”38 At another point in the narrative, Parnell relates finding Pakistan Army Frontier Corps identification cards on dead enemy fighters.39

Discussion

Several observations can be made about using history to understand the nature of military service. First, as Aristotle described, there are connections between society and the military. Humans are social and political animals, and as societies change, so, too, do aspects of the nature of military service. One topic that generated considerable discussion and exposed some diverse opinions among the student veterans and the other students was the role of women in combat units. The veterans universally opposed the idea and used examples of the hardships of combat endured in their own experiences and those recounted in the combat memoirs. However, a female student argued that the objective is that the military that accomplish its mission and that it should not matter whether the soldiers are male or female as long as they meet the same standards. A second point was that the danger of primordial violence can quickly become uncontrolled during modern wars,
particularly during counterinsurgencies, endangering the success of the effort. Violence must thus be directed against specific targets and focused on convincing an enemy to stop armed resistance. On this point, the students agreed. Third, discerning the proper end of military operations includes implementing a correct military approach to achieve a sustained peaceful state in which security is reasonably assured.

Most students referred to how improper behavior or decorum, or a lack of simple humanity, had led to horrible instances of human rights violations and even war crimes. Shocking incidents included the abuses of Abu Ghraib in 2003, the massacre of Afghan civilians in Kandahar and in Iraq by private military contractors, United States Marines urinating on dead Taliban fighters, and drone strikes that inadvertently killed civilians. These abuses strengthened the political message of the insurgents. However, the military has recognized the need to prevent or mitigate acts of criminality, senseless violence, and suffering unleashed on populations during counterinsurgencies. The military regulates the use of deadly force, often directly restraining soldiers from following their natural inclinations toward mindless aggression or revenge.

One student veteran shared how, after the course, he understood why his unit “did the ‘hearts and mind’ things it had done in Afghanistan,” although, at the time, he questioned the wisdom of not focusing solely on combat missions with the goal of killing insurgents. Another veteran observed how medics were required to treat wounded enemies. That same veteran commented that Callwell’s suggestion of getting the enemy to commit to battle by separating him from the larger population explained why his unit was judicious in terms of where and how they engaged suspected insurgents, taking care not to anger other villagers and thus create more enemy fighters. A third veteran, a Marine who had served in Afghanistan, remembered being critical of the military’s rules of engagement (ROE), but now recognized the importance of responding to insurgents with proportional force even when overwhelming indiscriminate violence seemed more expeditious at the time. A second Marine NCO, who served in Iraq immediately after the invasion, observed that his unit implemented counterinsurgency practices well before COIN officially was published, because practices such as gaining the trust of the local
population, bolstering the effectiveness of civilian authorities, and increasing security seemed more effective than combat operations in securing the country.

For the community veterans, the dialogues provided opportunities to tell their stories. Tom Harner, one of the on-site facilitators at a residential facility, related that at his location, the discussion served in lieu of the reunions his elderly resident veterans were no longer able to attend. Likewise, the students were struck by the similarities of military life across the generations, agreeing with Clausewitz that, despite technological advances, the nature of warfare does not change—neither does human nature, nor the desire to talk with each other in meaningful ways.
Notes


6. See Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006); and John Allen Williams, “The Military and Society: Beyond the Postmodern Era,” *Orbis* 52, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 199-216. These wars also mark military and social paradigm shifts. World War I, for example, was fought by societies that were still organized agriculturally and along early nineteenth-century lines. Known as “Second-Generation Warfare,” they used Napoleonic-era strategies, but employed technologically advanced industrial weapons. Because both sides were similarly armed and organized, the main battlefields of the Western Front underwent few strategic shifts until larger economic, political, and social changes ended the stalemate. Similarly, modern counterinsurgencies are known as “Fourth-Generation Warfare.” In the postmodern age, this form of warfare is waged between state and non-state actors.

7. It is important to note that the college identifies a student as a veteran if he or she is drawing VA benefits. Some veterans are not receiving benefits because they are either saving them for other academic degrees or they have expired. Therefore, these students are not officially counted.


13. Barno and Bensahel, “How to Talk to A Veteran.”
30. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 238.
32. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 239.
36. O’Donnell, We Were One, 87.
38. Parnell and Bruning, Outlaw Platoon, 135.
39. Parnell and Bruning, Outlaw Platoon, 347.