

The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Accord: Conflict and Compromise Engendered by Institutionalized Sectarianism

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The abolition of political sectarianism shall be a basic national goal and shall be achieved according to a staged plan.

– The Lebanese Constitution¹

WHEN LEBANON GAINED ITS INDEPENDENCE from France in 1943, it adopted a system that divided political power along clearly defined sectarian lines. The institutionalized sectarian nature of the country resulted in tensions that led to civil war in 1975. Lebanon quickly disintegrated into a number of irreconcilable cantons and seemed to be destined for a perpetual state of war. After 15 years of conflict a compromise was forged that, while not resolving the institutionalized sectarian tensions at the heart of Lebanon's problems, was successful in bringing the fighting to an end and maintaining peace. The trajectory of Lebanon's economic and social development after independence, the 15-year civil war that almost destroyed the country, and the agreement that ultimately ended that war all provide a basis for understanding the nature of institutionalized sectarianism in the modern world and the kinds of conflicts and compromises that such sectarianism is likely to engender.

Historically, the area that now constitutes Lebanon did not exist as a single unit until the French occupation of 1920-1943.² Since 1516, Lebanon had been an integral part of the Ottoman Empire [**Appendix A**]. In the 1920 San Remo Conference, Britain and France, as the main European victors in World War I, divided most of the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire among themselves with the French taking control of the region known as Syria, which included present-day Lebanon.³ Local Maronite Christians lobbied the French for the establishment of a viable Maronite-led state.⁴ The French acquiesced to their entreaties, carving out the borders of Lebanon such that it included Mount Lebanon, a Maronite Christian stronghold, as well as surrounding Muslim-dominated port cities

and agricultural regions that would make the state economically viable [Appendix B].⁵ The resulting state, originally known as Greater Lebanon, had a slight Christian majority.⁶

Throughout the French occupation, most Lebanese Muslims did not identify as Lebanese.⁷ They did not recognize the borders that the French had drawn separating Lebanon from Syria and they sought independence from France as part of a larger unified Syrian Arab entity.⁸ Most Maronite Christians, on the other hand, identified strongly as Lebanese.⁹ Most did not even view themselves as Arab, much less Syrian. Though many sought independence for Lebanon, they felt closer to the West than to the Arab world.¹⁰ In 1943, Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim leaders reached a historic compromise that led to Lebanon's independence from France.¹¹ This unwritten National Pact defined Lebanon as a state that identified as Arab but that would never become part of Syria or any other Arab state.¹²

The compromise also reserved certain positions for members of specific sects. As part of the National Pact, the Maronite and Sunni leaders agreed that the country's powerful president would always be a Maronite Christian, the much weaker prime minister would be a Sunni Muslim, and the ceremonial position of speaker of parliament would be a Shiite Muslim. The National Pact also agreed to the use of quotas in which, based loosely on a 1932 census, six legislative seats were reserved for Christians for every five Muslim seats.¹³ Within the 6/5 ratio, there were similar ratios that divided seats among the main Muslim sects—Sunni, Shiite, and Druze—and different Christian sects, most prominently Maronite and Greek Orthodox. The same ratios were used as the basis for sectarian quotas in the ministries and other administrative organs of the state.¹⁴

The institutionalized sectarian nature of the political and administrative positions in Lebanon strengthened identity on the basis of sect and deepened sectarian divisions. It prevented the establishment of cross-sectarian ties on the basis of ideology or class. Labor unions in Lebanon, for example, were organized on a sectarian bases while national cross-sectarian labor unions remained weak, despite governmental policies that allowed for the exploitation of workers from all sects.¹⁵ Repeated attempts to establish a national workers movement in Lebanon failed. Political parties, youth and women's movements, and professional associations were all similarly organized on sectarian rather than national lines.¹⁶

Meanwhile, the state doled out contracts and protected the economic interests of sectarian leaders resulting in the consolidation of a powerful commercial-financial oligarchy made up of the elite families from various sects.¹⁷ These leaders established patron-client relationships in which the powerful and wealthy oligarchs provided financial assistance, jobs, loans, contracts, and legal assistance to clients from within their own sect, gaining

their clients' loyalty in a system in which there was no real recourse to state assistance.¹⁸ These patronage networks resulted in rampant nepotism, corruption, exploitation, and inequality.¹⁹ As the competition for clients led to frequent intra-communal feuds, tensions between the sects also increased as the Muslim proportion of the overall population grew without any changes to the ratios that solidified overall Maronite Christian dominance.

These social, economic, and sectarian tensions boiled over into a civil war that began in 1975.²⁰ Sectarian militias formed and fought amongst each other.²¹ While many of the tensions that resulted in war were social and economic in nature, the Lebanese people identified so closely with their sects that the conflict took the form of a sectarian rather than a class or social conflict.²² As the conflict intensified, the country became divided into sectarian-led cantons.²³ Maronite, Shiite, and Druze militias held substantial areas of the country, while the neighboring states of Syria and Israel both intervened and occupied significant amounts of Lebanese territory [**Appendix C**].

Each sectarian canton had its own sources of external aid and support.²⁴ They controlled at least one port each, allowing sectarian leaders to gain lucrative sources of finance through export and import taxes.²⁵ The militia leaders, in fact, began benefitting economically and politically from the continuation of war. The war gave them control over the economic resources that either came from taxing the people under their control or that came as military and economic assistance from external sources.²⁶

The central government, while continuing to exist in name, lost almost all real power to the sectarian cantons and militia leaders.²⁷ There seemed to be no viable means of ending the conflict.²⁸ The Muslims demanded that any negotiated settlement bring an end to Maronite dominance.²⁹ Maronite leaders, on the other hand, made it clear that they preferred the partition of Lebanon over a peace agreement in which they would have to give up their traditional privileges.³⁰ Because the militia leaders benefitted from the war economy, they did not have a strong incentive to end the war. Numerous U.S. and Arab-sponsored attempts to negotiate agreements and ceasefires during the course of the war all ultimately failed to hold.³¹

The fighting became especially heavy in late 1988 when a series of events seemed to spell the end of the central government.³² According to the Lebanese constitution, the parliament chooses the president and the president chooses the prime minister.³³ The last parliamentary elections had taken place in 1972, since the civil war prevented new elections. In September 1988, the six-year term of the Lebanese president expired and the 73 surviving members of parliament could not agree on a successor. Before leaving office, the Maronite president, Amin Gemayel, broke tradition by naming the Maronite army commander, Michel Aoun as prime minister, a

position traditionally reserved for a Sunni Muslim [**Appendix D**].³⁴ Most Muslims rejected Aoun's appointment and continued to view Selim al-Hoss, a Sunni, as prime minister. The central government had no president and two people claiming to be prime minister.

Aoun was a populist who opposed the militia leaders and, with external assistance from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, rebuilt the Lebanese army.³⁵ After being appointed prime minister, Aoun declared a blockade on all militia ports and called for a "war of liberation" against Syria, which in 1975 had sent 35,000 troops into Lebanon as part of an Arab League peacekeeping force.³⁶ While the Syrian troops provided security in many of the Muslim-dominated parts of the country, most Maronites viewed Syria as an occupying power.³⁷ Aoun's attacks resulted in six months of heavy artillery duels across competing parts of Beirut. While the fighting resulted in heavy casualties, there was almost no movement on the ground. Aoun was not strong enough to push back the Syrian forces and the Syrians were constrained by international considerations from moving decisively against the Maronite canton in which Aoun was based.³⁸ In addition to Iraqi military assistance, Aoun had strong political backing from France and the Vatican. Israel, which had invaded Lebanon twice during the civil war and still held a swath of territory in South Lebanon, continued to control Lebanese air space. Israel prevented Syria from using air power against the Maronites and carried out mock bombing raids to deter Syria from undertaking a full ground assault against Aoun.³⁹

The heavy fighting pushed the Arab League to make an ambitious effort to negotiate an end to the war.⁴⁰ The Arab League invited the same surviving members of the Lebanese parliament who had been unable to agree on a president to the Saudi Arabian city of Taif to agree on a new political framework for Lebanon.⁴¹

After three weeks of intense negotiations, the parliamentarians agreed on a compromise that involved changing the 6/5 Christian-Muslim ratio to one in which there would be parity in parliament and all other institutions of the state.⁴² The compromise also confirmed that the state would continue to have a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, and a Shiite speaker of parliament, though the powers of the prime minister were expanded greatly at the expense of the president.⁴³ Besides the compromises over political reform, the main point of discussion in Taif was the continued Syrian presence in the country. The Maronite deputies wanted guarantees that the Syrians would withdraw. On the other hand, most Muslim delegates felt that the country's security could only be assured with a continued Syrian presence.⁴⁴ As a compromise, the Taif Accord made a vague call for the Syrian redeployment of troops after a two-year transition period and Syria went on record as recognizing the "sovereignty and independence" of

Lebanon.⁴⁵ Until that point, Syria had never recognized Lebanon, claiming that Lebanon was an integral part of Syria.⁴⁶ The Maronites accepted the Taif Accord with the belief that Saudi Arabia and the U.S. were sincere about their commitment to full Syrian withdrawal.⁴⁷

The 1989 Taif Accord recognized the reality of the demographic changes that had taken place since the 1932 census. As a compromise, it increased Muslim prerogatives in light of those changes but it did so in a way that preserved many Maronite interests. The Taif Accord acknowledged that institutionalized sectarianism had led to problems and it noted that “abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective.”⁴⁸ At the same time, however, it not only maintained the sectarian basis that lies at the heart of all the institutions of the state, but further consolidated sectarianism through a number of constitutional amendments.⁴⁹ While the Taif Accord had near unanimous approval of the parliamentarians with only one voting against it, the agreement did not have the support of the militia leaders nor did it have the support of Aoun, who argued that it did not do enough to guarantee a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.⁵⁰

The Taif Accord did not initially have a major impact in Lebanon.⁵¹ As part of the compromise, the parliamentarians also agreed on a new president, but Aoun refused to allow him to enter the presidential palace. In December 1989, fighting between Aoun’s forces and Syria intensified dramatically.⁵²

Aoun’s position was weakened when his main external backer, Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.⁵³ The U.S. immediately began forming a coalition to oust Iraq from Kuwait. In the U.S. view, it was important that the coalition include Arab states and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker believed that Syria, with its Arab nationalist credentials, added immense credibility to the coalition.⁵⁴ Syria agreed to provide political support and send a symbolic number of troops to join the anti-Iraq coalition in return for a freer rein in Lebanon. [**Appendix E**].⁵⁵ The U.S. assured Syria that neither Israel nor France would interfere with an assault on Aoun.⁵⁶ Undertaking a massive air and ground attack, Syria took over the Maronite canton in just a few hours on October 13, 1990.⁵⁷ All sides then agreed to stop fighting and establish a state on the basis of the Taif Accord.

With the exception of the Shiite militia Hezbollah, which argued that it had never fought against other Lebanese factions but was rather established and had to continue to resist Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon, all the other militias were demobilized.⁵⁸ The Taif Accord reconfigured the country’s politics while maintaining its sectarian nature. The sectarian core of the political system with its potential sources for future conflict remained intact, as did the sectarian-based patronage networks with their concomitant problems of political and economic

corruption and vast levels of inequality.⁵⁹ In 2014, a quarter of a century after the Taif Accord was signed, Lebanon had a Gini coefficient of 85.8%, making it the fifth most unequal state in the world after Ukraine, Russia, Denmark, and Kazakhstan.⁶⁰

There were a number of times since 1990 in which it seemed Lebanon might relapse into civil war. A former prime minister was assassinated in 2005 while campaigning for a new term. The assassination led to a popular uprising that ultimately forced the Syrian troops to withdraw.⁶¹ In 2006, Israel invaded in an attempt to destroy Hezbollah.⁶² In 2008, Hezbollah fighters entered and occupied Beirut, only withdrawing after the government conceded to a number of demands.⁶³ In 2011, a sectarian-based civil war broke out in Syria and more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees fled to Lebanon.⁶⁴ Syrians now constitute about 25% of the overall Lebanese population [Appendix F]. From May 2014 until October 2016, Lebanon went without a president as the parliament, similar to the situation in 1988, could not agree on a candidate.⁶⁵ Despite all the tensions and potential triggers for renewed conflict, the compromises that were forged in Taif prevented renewed warfare.⁶⁶

Lebanon was one of the first failed states of the post-World War II era and the term Lebanonization (*libanisation* in French) officially entered the French lexicon in 1991 as a term denoting the fragmentation of a state as a result of intractable conflict between diverse communities.⁶⁷ The Taif Accord, while imperfect in many ways, continues to represent a compromise that has maintained peace. In fact, the Taif Accord has frequently been held up as a potential model that could provide the framework for peace in Syria.⁶⁸ In Lebanon, the Taif Accord continues to be criticized by almost all parties for its numerous faults and imperfections but at the same time nearly all Lebanese citizens recognize its value in providing a structure upon which the different communities in Lebanon can share power. The institutionalized sectarian compromises of the Taif Accord have ultimately proven adept at ending a conflict that was triggered by institutionalized sectarian structures.

Notes

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
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68. Stephan Rosiny, "Power-Sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon's Taif Experience," *Middle East Policy* 20, no. 3 (Fall 2013), <http://www.mepc.org/power-sharing-syria-lessons-lebanons-taif-experience> (accessed January 30, 2018). Also see Reese Erlich, "Do Lebanon's Taif Accords offer Lessons for Syrian Peace?" *Global Post*, August 2, 2013, in Public Radio International, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-08-02/do-lebanons-taif-accords-offer-lessons-syrian-peace> (accessed January 30, 2018).


Appendix A

Maps Showing Lebanon as Part of the Ottoman Empire in 1520 and 1913

Source: Facing History and Ourselves, “Territorial Changes of the Ottoman Empire,” <https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/gallery/territorial-changes-ottoman-empire-1817-1913#9>, (accessed March 13, 2018).

Appendix B



Map Showing Mount Lebanon and the Current Borders of Lebanon



Source: Josephine Crawley Quinn, *In Search of the Phoenicians*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), <https://reader.paperc.com/books/in-search-of-the-phoenicians/903944/ch04> (accessed January 28, 2018).

Appendix C

Location of Forces during Lebanese Civil War: 1976 and 1987



Source: Mathew White, "War in Lebanon," *Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century*, July 2000, <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/lebanon.htm> (accessed January 31, 2018).

Appendix D

Amin Gemayel (right) Appointing Michel Aoun (left) Prime Minister



Source: Joseph Hokayem, “22 septembre, 1988 - Amine Gemayel remet le pouvoir au general Michel Aoun,” *Histoire de l’armee libanaise de 1945 a nos jours*, May 22, 2012, <https://histoiredelarmeelibanaise.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/1988-al-amine-gemayel-remet-le-pouvoir-au-premier-ministre-general-michel-aoun/> (accessed January 22, 2018).


Appendix E

James Baker Meeting Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad in Damascus

Source: Thinkport, “James Baker: The Man Who Made Washington Work,” September 14, 1990, <http://jamesbaker.thinkport.org/Documentary-Highlights/Peace-Maker.html> (accessed May 1, 2018).

Appendix F

Time Series Showing Growth of Syrian Refugee Population in Lebanon



Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Syria Refugee Response Lebanon: Time-series Syrian Refugees Registered by Cadastral in Lebanon as of 30 April, 2014,” *Reliefweb*, April 30, 2014, <https://reliefweb.int/map/lebanon/syria-refugee-response-lebanon-time-series-syrian-refugees-registered-cadastral-lebanon> (accessed January 14, 2018).

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Aoun, Michel. Press Conference, March 14, 1989, “General Aoun - Liberation War,” YouTube, Published March 20, 2009, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=obhvtOGhUuo> (accessed May 7, 2018).

This is a recording of a famous press conference during which Michel Aoun declared a war of liberation against Syria. During the press conference, Aoun asserted that all of the internal Lebanese problems could easily be resolved if the Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon. He claimed during the press conference that the Syrian troops were instigating problems among different Lebanese groups while using Lebanese territory to smuggle drugs into Europe. He called upon the Lebanese people from all different religious sects to join together and rise against what he called the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. It was clear from the questions asked during the press conference and from the manner in which Michel Aoun answered the questions that the concept of fighting a war of liberation against Syria was a novel idea and that previously no Lebanese group had openly called for a direct head-on confrontation with the Syrian troops, which had ostensibly come to Lebanon as a peacekeeping force at the beginning of the civil war. The press conference helped me understand the importance of Aoun’s statement and influenced me to include his declaration of a war of liberation in my paper.

Assad Hafez al-, and Elias Hraoui. “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic,” May 22, 1991. United Nations Peacemaker. Treaty Series, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB-SY_910522_TreatyBrotherhoodCooperationCoordination.pdf (accessed May 3, 2018).

This treaty between Syria and Lebanon was concluded a year and a half after the Taif Accord was signed and codified some of the aspects that were agreed upon during the Taif negotiations, including the Syrian commitment to redeploy its troops once a number of conditions were met. The treaty also marked the first official document in which Syria recognized Lebanon as a state, confirming the Syrian president’s recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon that he had made during the Taif negotiations. While Syria officially recognized Lebanon as a country in the text of the treaty, the treaty also made clear that Syria would dominate Lebanon. Within the treaty, Lebanon agreed to coordinate all of its security, economic and political policies with Syria. Reading the text of the treaty helped me understand the extent to which Lebanon had become almost a satellite country of Syria in 1991. It also helped me understand the reasons that many Lebanese considered Syria an occupying power until they finally withdrew their troops in 2005.

Baker, James. *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992*. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995.

James Baker's memoirs about his time as U.S. Secretary of State proved useful in understanding U.S. policy during the last two years of the Lebanese Civil War. It was during Baker's time as Secretary of State that the Taif Accord was negotiated and that Syrian participation in the coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait led to a change in the U.S. position toward Syria, ultimately providing Syria with the cover it needed to take over the Maronite canton and bring the Lebanese Civil War to an end. While the memoirs provide detailed information on U.S. foreign policy during Baker's term, it was interesting to me that Baker did not even mention the negotiations over the Taif Accord, underscoring the minimal role the U.S. played in the negotiations. The book does, however, provide a detailed account of U.S. policy after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Baker explains why he felt it was so important to have Syria join the anti-Iraq coalition and the book provides an account of his visit to Syria in September, 1989. Baker notes how the visit was controversial within the Bush administration but how he strongly felt that it was needed to serve larger U.S. interests. The book helped me understand the crucial role the U.S. played in the Middle East and how that role impacted the Lebanese Civil War.

Bikasini, Jurj. *Asrar al-Taif: min ahd Amin al-Gemayyel hatta suqoot al-ginraal* [The secrets of Ta'if: from the reign of Amin Gemayyel to the fall of the general]. Beirut: Dar al-Ta'awunia al-Tiba'iyya, 1993.

Jurj Bikasini is a Lebanese journalist who reported from Taif while the Taif Accord was being negotiated and had access to and interviewed the parliamentarians on a daily basis. This book provided me with a wealth of detail about the day to day events and arguments from a first-person perspective that occurred during the three weeks that the Lebanese parliamentarians were in Taif. Bikasini reported on the perspectives of numerous individual parliamentarians and how those perspectives changed during the course of the negotiations. He provided details about which parliamentarians were consulting various militia and other leaders in Lebanon as well as which ones were talking to Syrian officials. The book helped me understand why certain parliamentarians changed their minds during the three weeks of negotiations and what kinds of assurances the parliamentarians were provided by Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Arab League, and the United States. The book was most useful in helping me understand that the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon proved to be a much more important issue and one that was more difficult to compromise over than the constitutional changes. Most of the secondary sources I read that discussed the Taif Accord focused on the constitutional changes and the changing political framework, but this book helped me understand that the real dispute was over the continued presence of Syrian troops in the country. The book convinced me to change major portions of my paper to include more information about the Syrian troops.

Bou Assi, Pierre, and Philippe Lazzarini. "Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 (2018 Update)." In *Syria: Regional Refugee Response: Interagency Information Sharing Portal*, United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/61740> (accessed January 29, 2018).

This UNHCR website contained a wealth of information about the places to which refugees from the Syrian conflict fled. The website noted that there were about 1 million Syrian refugees officially registered in Lebanon in 2018 but that the government had demanded a suspension of any new registrations in 2015, despite the fact that more refugees were entering Lebanon. In the detailed report about Lebanon on the website, UN and Lebanese officials estimate the total number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon at over 1.5 million, making the Syrian refugees approximately 25% of the overall Lebanese population. The report noted the numerous problems the refugees were facing in Lebanon, helping me to realize how potentially destabilizing the Syrian conflict was to Lebanon.

Bush, George. "White House Statement on the President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia." June 14, 1989. Reprinted by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=17141> (accessed January 15, 2018).

This statement by President George Bush is significant in that it outlined U.S. support for the Saudi-led effort to bring the Lebanese parliamentarians to Taif to negotiate an end to the Lebanese Civil War and that it stressed the U.S. position that the removal of Syrian troops from Lebanon was a prerequisite to a lasting solution to Lebanon's problems. The U.S. maintained the position outlined in this statement until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait after which the U.S. acquiesced to the continued presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon in return for Syrian support for the anti-Iraq coalition. Seeing how much the issue of Syrian troop withdrawal was stressed in this statement helped me to realize the importance of the later change of position.

. "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Agreement for National Reconciliation in Lebanon." October 23, 1989. Reprinted by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=17685&st=Lebanon&st1=> (accessed January 26, 2018).

This is the official U.S. statement concerning the signing of the Taif Accord and it is very significant in that while commending the accord (officially the Agreement for National Reconciliation in Lebanon), it clearly states that the accord is only the first step toward an "independent Lebanon, free of all foreign forces." The statement seems specifically designed to reassure the Maronite community in Lebanon that the U.S. would stick by its assurances that it would continue demanding a full Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, even though the accord itself was vague on this point. The statement helped me understand how important the point of Syrian troops was to the Maronite community.

. "The President's News Conference." November 7, 1989. Reprinted by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://>

www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=17762&st=Lebanon&st1= (accessed January 26, 2018).

In President Bush's first news conference after the signing of the Taif Accord, he made a special point to discuss the accord at length, commending Saudi Arabia and the Lebanese parliamentarians for their hard work in attempting to bring about a peaceful resolution of the civil war. President Bush's words were especially significant in that he repeatedly stressed the importance of a full Syrian withdrawal of troops from Lebanon. The manner by which Bush spoke about the Syrian troops, along with the earlier presidential statement by Marlin Fitzwater, seem to make it very clear that it was official U.S. policy to mention the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon whenever mentioning the Taif Accord.

_____. "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a White House Briefing for Representatives of the Arab-American Community." September 24, 1990. Reprinted by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=18851&st=Lebanon&st1=> (accessed January 28, 2018).

This White House Briefing marked the first time President Bush officially spoke about Lebanon after the August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Bush's words at this briefing marked a transformation in the U.S. policy concerning Syria's presence in Lebanon. In all official statements up to this one, Bush mentioned the importance of a full withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. During this briefing, when Bush was specifically asked about Syrian atrocities in Lebanon, he responded by noting that Syria had an important role to play in bringing peace to Lebanon. At no time during the briefing did President Bush call for Syrian troops to withdraw. While a number of secondary sources asserted that the Bush administration gave Syria a green light to take over the Maronite canton in Lebanon, seeing how the official American narrative changed so dramatically helped me realize the extent to which that seems to have happened.

_____. "Interview with Middle Eastern Journalists." March 8, 1991. Reprinted by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19375&st=Lebanon&st1=> (accessed January 28, 2018).

This transcript of a long interview that President Bush held with a number of Middle Eastern journalists a few days after the liberation of Kuwait included a number of references to Syria and Lebanon. As in the November discussion with Arab-Americans, Bush spoke positively of Syria's role in Lebanon in stark contrast to the official statements that had been made before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Bush never once mentioned during the interview that Syrian troops should withdraw from Lebanon, helping me better understand what was meant in the secondary sources that mentioned the U.S. acquiesced in allowing Syria to crush the Maronite forces and impose its will on the Lebanese people.

Cambanis, Thanassis. *A Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollah's Legions and Their Endless War Against Israel*. New York: Free Press, 2010.

Thanassis Cambanis is a journalist who lived among Hezbollah fighters and their families from 2006 to 2009 while reporting for a number of Western newspapers. In this book, he describes his personal interactions with the members and supporters of Hezbollah providing a first-person narrative that deeply explores the ideas, worldview, and perspectives of Hezbollah. The book helped me understand the Shiite movement better than any other source I read. It was especially useful in helping me understand the events that led Hezbollah to occupy Beirut during the summer of 2008. The book helped me understand how potentially destabilizing the Hezbollah occupation was and how it marked a transformation from Hezbollah's earlier stance of only resisting the Israeli occupation and not confronting other Lebanese. The book convinced me to add a sentence about the Hezbollah occupation of Beirut among the list of events that nearly led to renewed civil war in Lebanon.

Council of the League of Nations. "French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon," July 24, 1922. Reprinted in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Supplement: Official Documents, 177-182. <http://www.ndu.edu.lb/Lerc/resources/French%20Mandate%20for%20Syria%20and%20the%20Lebanon.pdf> (accessed May 10, 2018).

The text of the League of Nations Mandate that gave control over Syria and Lebanon to France helped me understand the conditions under which France took formal control over Syria and Lebanon after World War I, though they had been in military control of the territory even before the mandate was passed. Reading the text of the mandate also helped me understand how Syria and Lebanon were not really defined as two separate states at the time and that the borders between what constituted Syria and what constituted Lebanon were not clear.

Cowell, Alan. "Lebanese Said to Reject U.S.-Syria Election Plan." *New York Times*, September 20, 1988. <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/20/world/lebanese-said-to-reject-us-syria-election-plan.html> (accessed January 11, 2018).

This article reported on the opposition from Lebanese militia leaders to a plan being promoted by both the United States and Syria for Lebanese presidential elections that aimed at unifying the country. The article reported that members of the most powerful Christian militias were opposed to any plan that would dilute their historical strength in Lebanon and noted that they had already carved out the borders of what was being called Maronistan, a mini-state that Maronite leaders favored over having to share power with Muslims in a larger Lebanon. The article helped me understand how entrenched the Maronite Christian leaders were in their beliefs and on how unlikely it seemed as late as 1988 that a peace agreement would end the fighting and unify the country. The article noted that an eventual partition of Lebanon seemed a more likely scenario.

Credit Suisse. *Global Wealth Databook, 2014*, (October 2014). <https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=5521F296-D460-2B88-081889DB12817E02> (accessed January 4, 2018).

This annual publication by Credit Suisse provides detailed information about the distribution of wealth in every country in the world. The publication shows that Lebanon, with a Gini Coefficient of 85.8%, had the fifth most unequally distributed wealth in the world in 2014. Lebanon's inequality is far worse than any other country in the Middle East. The databook also provides longitudinal data that shows inequality in Lebanon was not just a short term occurrence but was something that was consistent over a long period of time. The book helped me understand in real data what I had read about in a number of secondary sources concerning inequality in Lebanon and how inequality in Lebanon is far worse than other countries in the Middle East and most countries of the world.

Elabiad, Mohamad. Interview by author. Memphis, TN. January 31, 2018.

Dr. Mohamad Elabiad is a Sunni Muslim who was an eyewitness who lived in Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War and is now a physician living in Memphis, Tennessee. In my discussion with him, he described to me the hardships that occurred during the war and what it was like living in a country that had no real central government or police force and in which militias often abused citizens at checkpoints. He described how population transfers took place in which communities that had once lived side-by-side were forced to leave their homes to live in areas controlled by militias of their own sect. Dr. Elabiad discussed how the abuses that were committed in the name of sectarian militias left lasting scars that made it difficult then and even now for the different religious communities to fully trust each other and live together in peace. My interview with Dr. Elabiad was very useful in providing me with a personal viewpoint that helped me understand the hardships and animosities that were engendered by the war.

Erlich, Reese. "Do Lebanon's Taif Accords offer Lessons for Syrian Peace?" *Global Post*, August 2, 2013. In Public Radio International. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-08-02/do-lebanons-taif-accords-offer-lessons-syrian-peace> (accessed January 30, 2018).

In this article, Reese Erlich quotes extensively from Hussein al-Husseini, who had been speaker of the Lebanese parliament in 1989 when the parliamentarians negotiated the Taif Accord. While al-Husseini was critical of some aspects of how the Taif Accord has been implemented over the more than two decades since it was passed, he also noted that it not only provided a framework that has kept the peace in Lebanon but also that it could provide a potential model to end conflict in neighboring Syria. The article helped me understand the long-term impact of the Taif Accord on Lebanon and the larger Middle Eastern region.

Fattah, Hassan. "Syria Pledges Pullout Again Amid Protests by Lebanese." *New York Times*, February 22, 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/22/world/>

middleeast/syria-pledges-pullout-again-amid-protests-by-lebanese.html (accessed January 3, 2018).

This article reported on the mass protests that broke out in Lebanon after the February 14, 2005 assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Protestors were blaming Syria for the assassination and demanding the withdrawal of Syrian troops. The article helped me understand why Syria remained in Lebanon for more than 15 years after the Taif Accord was reached and how that occupation had come to be viewed negatively by most Sunni Muslims and Christians. The protests and counter-protests, which were largely organized by Shiite Muslims, also helped me realize the continued precarious situation in Lebanon. The article repeatedly referred to the Taif Accord, helping me realize how important the accord was to the post-war period in Lebanon.

Fisk, Robert. *Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon*. New York: Nation Books, 2002.

Robert Fisk is a British journalist who has lived and reported from Beirut since 1976. The book helped me understand the level of the atrocities that took place during the war as well as how it seemed for many years that there would be no negotiated solution to the conflict. The most useful part of the book was when Fisk discussed the numerous conversations he had with almost all Lebanese political figures as well as with many Syrian political figures involved in the war. His insights into the personality of Michel Aoun and the events of the last two years of the war are especially insightful. In the book, he writes in detail about his numerous visits to Aoun as well as the political context in which the events of the last two years of the war took place, helping me understand the complexity of the situation in which Aoun was supported at the same time by Iraq, Israel, France, and the Vatican and how Iraq's invasion of Kuwait radically transformed the political situation in Lebanon.

Friedman, Thomas. *From Beirut to Jerusalem*. New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1989.

This autobiographical book about the decade that *New York Times* author Thomas Friedman spent in Beirut and Jerusalem during the 1980s provided a personal narrative about the feelings and aspirations of the people in Beirut during the years of the civil war. The book was especially useful in helping me understand how in the mid-1980s it seemed that the war would continue forever as the differences between the various sides to the conflict became irreconcilable. It also helped me understand how changes in Syrian policy during the war were viewed by people living in Beirut as well as how the Israeli invasion in 1982 changed many of the dynamics of the war. The book also helped me understand how U.S. peacekeepers were viewed by various factions during the war. Being able to read about the war from a highly personal account helped me understand the situation better than books that talked about the conflict in the past tense.

Gamble, Hadley, and Saad al-Hariri. "A Conversation with Saad Hariri, President of the Council of Ministers of Lebanon," *World Economic Forum*, January 24, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPuSK6220hA> (accessed January 29, 2018).

This interview with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland helped me understand the problems that Lebanon still faces today because of its fractured political system. The interview helped me understand the level to which Saudi Arabia, which sponsored the Taif Accord in 1989, continues to have a great level of influence over Lebanese politics, as do a number of other external powers, thus increasing the threat that the spillover from Syria or other regional issues could have a destabilizing impact on Lebanon.

Georges-Picot, Francois, and Mark Sykes. "The Sykes-Picot Agreement." 1916. Reprinted by *The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sykes.asp (accessed January 15, 2018).

The text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement helped me understand the mindset of the French and British imperial authorities. At the time the agreement was reached, the British were promising the Arabs an independent state that would constitute all the Arab lands that had been part of the Ottoman Empire while the text of this agreement shows that at the same time they secretly agreed to divide the area between themselves and France. The agreement also helped me understand how the borders that now make up Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Israel, Jordan, and Iraq are artificial creations of the French and British. This helped me understand the deep divisions over identity that have existed in Lebanon since its establishment as a French Mandate and later an independent state.

Gerald Ford Library. "Memorandum of Conversation," April 7, 1976, 8:05 - 9:25 a.m. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVI. Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976. Office of the Historian, Department of State, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d283> (accessed March 10, 2018).

This conversation between President Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Brent Scowcroft, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, helped President Ford realize the severity of the situation in Lebanon thus precipitating a National Security Council meeting later that same day. In the conversation documented here, Kissinger repeatedly stressed how the Lebanese central government had for all intents and purposes ceased to exist. This document shows that despite the official proclamations in which the U.S. referred to the Lebanese government, U.S. officials knew that the Lebanese government in fact had lost all real power at the very beginning of the civil war. The document helped me understand the nature of the conflict in Lebanon and why it became so hard to resolve.

_____. "Minutes of National Security Council Meeting," April 7, 1976, 2:35-4:00 p.m. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVI. Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976. Office of the Historian, Department of State, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d284> (accessed March 10, 2018).

The minutes of this detailed discussion about the Lebanese Civil War among President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and CIA Director George Bush was fascinating in that numerous points that were made by the officials were not repeated in public statements. The most useful points in the conversation for my paper was the extent to which the U.S. officials were aware of extensive foreign support to different sides in the Lebanese Civil War. Kissinger and Bush noted that different Lebanese groups were receiving military and economic assistance from Israel, Syria, Libya, Iraq, the Soviet Union, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

_____. "Minutes of Washington Special Action Groups Meeting," October 10, 1975, 10:40 - 11:10 a.m. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVI. Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976. Office of the Historian, Department of State, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d264> (accessed May 9, 2018).

In this meeting, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, CIA William Colby, and Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements discussed the early stages of the conflict in Lebanon and noted that armed groups were beginning to form on sectarian lines. While most of the discussion in the meeting was over U.S. options toward either attempting to end the conflict or not getting involved, the document was most useful for me in providing a forthright analysis of the situation in Lebanon in 1975 as the conflict was in its earliest stages. The document helped me understand the reasons that the conflict ultimately degenerated into a sectarian war.

Hamadi, Tahsin. Interview by author. Memphis, TN. May 6, 2018.

Tahsin Hamadi is a businessman in Memphis who grew up in Lebanon and was an eyewitness to the early years of the Lebanese Civil War. He is a Shiite Muslim whose father and uncle were both killed in 1977 by the Kataeb, a Maronite militia that was led at the time by Bashir Gemayel, whose brother Amin later became the president of Lebanon. Mr. Hamadi helped me understand the nature of Lebanese society and the kinds of social relations that took place among the Lebanese people before the war. He noted that there are very few structured interactions among Lebanese from different religious sects. He explained to me that not only political parties, but also scouts and other youth groups, women's organizations, professional associations, and labor unions are all organized on sectarian grounds. He told me that even the schools are largely segregated by sect. My interview with Mr. Hamadi influenced me to look further into this aspect of Lebanese society and to include a section in my paper about how the lack of cross-sectarian ties was one of the factors that led to conflict.

Hijazi, Ihsan. "Aoun of Lebanon, Is He a National Savior, or as Foes Say, a 'Mad General'?" *New York Times*, September 10, 1989. <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/10/world/aoun-of-lebanon-is-he-a-national-savior-or-as-foes-say-a-mad-general.html> (accessed January 12, 2018).

This *New York Times* article reported on the rise of the populist military general, Michel Aoun, who had first fought against other Christian militias to take control over the major Maronite canton and then began what he called a war of national liberation against the Syrians. The article helped me understand how powerful Aoun was at the time the Taif Accord was being negotiated by Lebanese parliamentarians in Saudi Arabia. It was also very useful in helping me understand exactly what Aoun believed and how his ideas differed from many other Maronite leaders. While Aoun was popular among the Maronites he attempted to reach out to Muslims by advocating a Lebanese nationalism that would free Lebanon from what he called the Syrian occupation.

_____. "Beirut Fighting Defies New Cease-Fire Effort." *New York Times*, February 20, 1987. <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/20/world/beirut-fighting-defies-new-cease-fire-effort.html> (accessed January 11, 2018).

This *New York Times* article reported on a failed Syrian attempt to impose a cease-fire on Beirut and on how continued fighting in the city led to the deaths of at least 135 people despite the cease-fire. The article also reported on numerous similar failed attempts to stop the fighting in Beirut over a period of months during which each effort inevitably failed. The article also mentioned that whenever the fighting did stop for a period of time, militia leaders would work to fortify their positions rather than take steps to bring about national reconciliation. The article helped me understand how difficult it had become to expect any lasting peace agreement by the late 1980s.

_____. "Cease-Fire in Beirut is Shattered After 10 Weeks." *New York Times*, December 6, 1989. <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/06/world/cease-fire-in-beirut-is-shattered-after-10-weeks.html> (accessed January 20, 2018).

This article reported on the situation in Lebanon in the weeks after President Rene Moawad's assassination. Rene Moawad was the first president elected to lead Lebanon after the signing of the Taif Accord but he was killed in a massive car bomb just 17 days after taking office. The article helped me understand that while the Taif Accord continued to be discussed as a potential framework for ending the civil war, events on the ground prevented the implementation of the accord's principles and the war not only continued but started taking on one of its most violent phases. The article was very useful in helping me understand the situation in Lebanon in late 1989.

_____. "Fear of Civil War Grows in Lebanon." *New York Times*, September 24, 1988. <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/24/world/fear-of-civil-war-grows-in-lebanon.html> (accessed January 27, 2018).

This article was written the day that President Amin Gemayel appointed Michel Aoun as prime minister just a few hours before his presidential term

expired. The article helped me understand that at the time it seemed the country was on the verge of renewed fighting and that there seemed no possible way to end the civil war short of partitioning the country.

_____. "Lebanon Fighting Takes Heavy Toll." *New York Times*, March 15, 1989. <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/15/world/lebanon-fighting-takes-heavy-toll.html> (accessed January 3, 2018).

This article reports on Michel Aoun's declaration of a blockade against all militia ports and his declaration of a war of liberation against Syria. The article notes that Aoun's moves were leading to some of the heaviest fighting in years. It also reported extensively on the Syrian role in Lebanon, helping me understand why Aoun took such a strong position against their continued presence.

Hokayem, Joseph. "22 septembre, 1988 - Amine Gemayel remet le pouvoir au general Michel Aoun." *Histoire de l'armee libanaise de 1945 a nos jours*. May 22, 2012. <https://histoiredelarmeelibanaise.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/1988-al-amine-gemayel-remet-le-pouvoir-au-premier-ministre-general-michel-aoun/> (accessed January 22, 2018).

I used a picture from September 22, 1988 that was located on this website in my appendix. The picture shows the ceremony in which the Maronite President Amin Gemayal appointed the Maronite Army Commander Michel Aoun as prime minister of Lebanon, breaking a Lebanese tradition that the prime minister should be a Sunni Muslim. The appointment of Aoun led to a particularly severe bout of fighting. The photo provided a visual image of some of the main characters at an important point during the Lebanese Civil War.

Hubbard, Ben, and Hwaida Saad. "Lebanon's Vanishing Prime Minister is Back at Work: Now What?" *New York Times*, November 25, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/world/middleeast/lebanon-saad-hariri-iran-saudi-arabia.html> (accessed January 27, 2018).

This article reported on the bizarre three-week period during which the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned while visiting Saudi Arabia, seemed as if he was under some kind of house arrest in Saudi Arabia, and then, when allowed to leave, returned to Lebanon where he rescinded his resignation. The article helped me understand the myriad political problems that continue to plague Lebanon largely because of the sectarian conflicts that continue to this day to mark almost all aspects of the Lebanese state.

Human Rights Council. *Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/25 of 15 March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights Council"*. United Nations General Assembly, Nov. 23, 2006. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20A%20HRC%203%202.pdf> (accessed May 2, 2018).

This report provided an in depth account of the human rights violations that took place during the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon. The report helped me understand how Hezbollah's actions were destabilizing to Lebanon as well as

how the Israeli attacks on Lebanese infrastructure and civilian targets threatened to lead to a breakdown of the Lebanese state. The report helped me understand how fragile Lebanon remained more than 15 years after its civil war ended.

Ibrahim, Youssef. "Lebanese Factions Agree on Charter to Resolve Strife." *New York Times*, October 23, 1989. <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/23/world/lebanese-factions-agree-on-charter-to-resolve-strife.html> (accessed January 12, 2018).

This article reported on the accord by Lebanese parliamentarians that formed the basis for the peace that finally ended Lebanon's 15-year civil war. The article helped me understand the differing viewpoints at the time, especially those of Michel Aoun who opposed the accord and said he would arrest anyone who signed it.

_____. "Lebanese Militia Leaders Fault Proposed Charter." *New York Times*, October 24, 1989. <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/24/world/lebanese-militia-leaders-fault-proposed-charter.html> (accessed January 20, 2018).

This *New York Times* article reported on the reaction of the militia leaders to the Taif Accord. The article helped me understand the extent to which the militias opposed the accord as well as the reasons that Michel Aoun, the army commander, opposed the accord. The article was useful in helping me understand the situation on the ground in Lebanon when the accord was reached.

International Labor Organization and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. "Characteristics and Structure of the Union Movement in Lebanon, September 2016." In *ILO in the Arab States*, International Labor Organization, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_535107.pdf (accessed April 2, 2018).

The International Labor Organization website contains a wealth of data about the labor movement in Lebanon. This report discusses in detail the weakness of Lebanon's labor unions and how the strength of sectarianism in Lebanon has prevented the emergence of national level labor unions. The report shows that instead of such national movements, labor has generally organized along sectarian lines and workers remain locked into patronage networks with sectarian elites that hinder the ability of workers to obtain fairer working conditions. This report helped me understand how sectarianism has prevented the development of cross-sectarian ties on the basis of class and economic interests.

Jaber, Ali. "Lebanon's President Killed as Bomb Rips His Motorcade; Peace Efforts are Set Back." *New York Times*, November 23, 1989. <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/23/world/lebanon-s-president-killed-as-bomb-rips-his-motorcade-peace-efforts-are-set-back.html> (accessed January 20, 2018).

This article helped me understand the precarious nature of the Taif Accord in the weeks after it was signed as it continued to be opposed by the Lebanese militias as well as the army commander, Michel Aoun. The *New York Times* articles written around the time of the Taif Accord provided me with a much

more in-depth understanding of the complexities of the situation in Lebanon and the different positions of the various actors than the secondary sources that provided later summaries of those same events.

Jumblatt, Kamal. "Interview with Lebanese Socialist Leader Kamal Jumblatt," April 14, 1976. Associated Press Archive. Published on YouTube July 24, 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hEwShSlnqE> (accessed April 28, 2018).

Kamal Jumblatt was the leader of the Druze sect in Lebanon at the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War and he became a spokesperson for all the Muslim and leftist forces that were fighting against the Maronites. In this extensive interview with the Associated Press he said that the sectarian system of Lebanon was from the Middle Ages and he compared it to the Apartheid system in South Africa. He asserted that any negotiated settlement to the civil war would have to bring an end to sectarianism and the establishment of a truly secular, modern system. The interview helped me understand the mindset of the Muslim forces and what their leaders were advocating for at the opening stages of the civil war.

Karam, Hannah. Phone interview by author. May 13, 2018.

Hannah Karam is a Maronite Christian who lived in Lebanon throughout the civil war and is now the priest at the St. Anthony and St. George Maronite Church in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The interview with Mr. Karam helped me understand the Maronite perspective on the war as well as the tragic conditions that existed during the war. Karam explained to me that during the war, people rarely left the sectarian based cantons in which they were living and that it was especially dangerous in the large cities. The interview with Mr. Karam was most useful in helping me understand that despite the horrors that took place during the war and despite the fact that Maronites lost a significant amount of political power as a result of the war, most Maronites have reconciled themselves to the realities of the current situation in Lebanon and that now most Maronites get along well with Muslims in the country. He, in fact, helped me understand that most sectarian conflict in Lebanon now is between Sunni and Shiite Muslims and that Maronites and other Christians have good relations with the Muslim communities of Lebanon.

Kimbrel, Nicholas. "Assad Issues Decree to Establish Full Diplomatic Relations with Lebanon." *Daily Star*, October 15, 2008. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2008/Oct-15/52578-assad-issues-decree-to-establish-full-diplomatic-relations-with-lebanon.ashx> (accessed April 28, 2018).

The *Daily Star* is Lebanon's leading English-language newspaper. While the paper was closed during most of the civil war, it reopened in 1996. The paper's archives proved useful in helping me understand the situation in Lebanon over the past 20 years. This article reported on a Syrian decree which for the first time led to the opening of a Syrian Embassy in Lebanon. While Syria had signed a treaty with Lebanon in 1991, only after this 2008 decree did Syria establish formal relations with Lebanon. The article helped me understand the extent to which the idea that Lebanon was an integral part of

Syria remained official Syrian policy for more than 50 years after Lebanon's formal independence from France.

Larousse: Dictionnaires de francais, s.v. "libanisation" <http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/libanisation/46955> (accessed January 29, 2018).

This online French dictionary confirmed to me that the word Lebanonization had officially entered the French lexicon, having a meaning similar to Balkanization in English. I included this reference work as a primary source because it functioned not so much as to give me the meaning of a word but rather to prove that the word has become an official word in the French language.

The Lebanese Constitution. Reprinted by *Arab Law Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1997, 224-261.

The copy of the Lebanese Constitution helped me understand how sectarianism became institutionalized in Lebanon over time. While many secondary sources claim that the Lebanese constitution requires that the president be Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni and the speaker of the parliament a Shiite, there is no such clause in the constitution. That custom came from the unwritten National Pact. Thus when Amin Gemayel appointed Michel Aoun as prime minister he was not in fact violating the constitution, as many sources claimed. Also there is nowhere in the 1943 constitution that says parliamentary seats were to be apportioned according to a 6/5 ratio. In the 1927 constitution, it did state that confessional groups should be represented in parliament according to the "current electoral law" but the reference to confessional groups was removed in a 1943 amendment. Only as part of the Taif Accord was a clause put into the constitution stating that seats should be apportioned on confessional grounds. Reading all the amendments added to the constitution after the Taif Accord helped me understand the manner by which the accord changed the constitutional structure of Lebanon, especially in how it apportioned power between the president and prime minister. It was also useful to read the clauses describing how the eventual abolition of political sectarianism is a national goal.

The Lebanese Phalanges: Kataeb Party. "History of the Lebanese Phalanges." Kataebonline. <http://www.kataebonline.org/history.html> (accessed December 27, 2017).

The official website of the al-Kataeb Party, the largest Maronite political movement and the leading force in the largest Maronite militias during the civil war, helped me understand the political philosophy and viewpoints of the Maronite leaders. The website espouses the importance of the Christian identity to Lebanon's history. The article on the history of the movement noted the role the party played during the civil war and asserted that even today the party calls for decentralization of Lebanon to ensure that the Maronites can continue to play the historical role of leadership over the parts of the country predominantly inhabited by Christians. The website was particularly useful in helping me understand the philosophy behind Maronite leaders who in the late 1980s were advocating the partition of Lebanon.

Maricham, James. "Beirut Crisis Worse Than in '58." *New York Times*, October 24, 1975. <http://www.nytimes.com/1975/10/24/archives/beirut-crisis-worse-than-in-58-death-toll-is-higher-and-the-economy.html> (accessed November 29, 2017).

This *New York Times* article reported on the sectarian fighting and economic tensions in Lebanon in 1975 and noted that while in October the term "civil war" was still not widely being used, the country had in effect been in a civil war since April. The article helped me understand the complexity of the sectarian, political, economic, and social issues facing Lebanon at the time, the reasons that conflict had started, and the difficulties that the Lebanese faced in trying to bring the conflict to an end.

Randal, Jonathan. *Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon*. New York: Viking Press, 1983.

Jonathan Randal was a *Washington Post* journalist who reported from Beirut during the first few years of the Lebanese Civil War. In this book he provided a first-person account of his interactions with many of the Lebanese political and military actors who were involved in the conflict. It was especially useful in helping me understand the rise of some of the Christian militia leaders, especially Bashir Gemayel, with whom Randal spent an extensive amount of time. Randal discussed Gemayel's ideas through the conversations and interactions that he had with him and helped me understand the mindset of many of the Maronite militia leaders who felt that they had a natural right to rule Lebanon. This helped me understand how difficult it would be to resolve the conflict. The book was also useful in helping me understand how during the civil war, lower and middle-class militia leaders began to supplant many of the established oligarchic Lebanese leaders and how that phenomenon played a role in the intensity and length of the conflict.

Spears, Edward. *Fulfillment of a Mission: Syria and Lebanon 1941-1944*. London: Archon Books, 1977.

This book is the fascinating memoir of Major-General Sir Edward Spears, the British minister to Syria and Lebanon during World War II. During the German occupation of France, Spears became the de facto colonial leader of Syria and Lebanon between 1941 and 1944, serving to support the Free French against Vichy French forces. Spears became highly critical of French policy in Syria and Lebanon and is often described as the facilitator of the Muslim and Christian elite compromises that ultimately spearheaded the independence of Lebanon. This book provided me with a detailed and nuanced account of the events that took place in 1942 and 1943 ultimately resulting in Lebanon's independence. Interestingly, Spears never mentions the National Pact as at the time it had not yet been named. Yet, he describes the kinds of compromises that brought Muslim and Christian Lebanese together against the French better than any secondary source that I read. The book was especially helpful in enabling me to understand the reasons the Lebanese Christians had become critical of France and ultimately sought independence.

The Ta'if Accord. *al-Bab*. <http://al-bab.com/documents/taif-accord> (accessed November 10, 2017).

Reading the text of the accord that ultimately formed the basis for the peace agreement that ended Lebanon's Civil War helped me understand the kinds of compromises that the various sides to the conflict had to make for peace to endure. I was especially surprised to find that in the actual text of the accord there seemed to be an admission that it was imperfect and that a more ideal solution would bring a total end to sectarian quotas but that such an ideal was not feasible at the time the agreement was made.

Thinkport. "James Baker: The Man Who Made Washington Work," September 14, 1990. <http://jamesbaker.thinkport.org/Documentary-Highlights/Peace-Maker.html> (accessed May 1, 2018).

I used an image of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker meeting with Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad from this source in my appendix. The meeting was controversial in that the State Department had officially designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. The picture exemplified the importance James Baker placed on having Syria join the anti-Iraq coalition. In the meeting that took place in Damascus on September 14, 1990, the U.S. assured Syria that it would be allowed to take over the Maronite canton in Lebanon in exchange for Syrian support against Iraq. Syria's assault on the Maronites ultimately led to the conditions which brought the Lebanese Civil War to an end. The importance of the meeting for the overall arguments of my paper led me to put this picture in my appendix.

Torbey, Carine. "Lebanon: Will New President End Political Crisis." *BBC News*, October 31, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37821698> (accessed January 12, 2018).

This article reported on the election of a new president in Lebanon after a political crisis during which the country went two and a half years without a president because of the inability of the parliament to agree on a candidate. The article helped me understand how sectarian tensions continue to threaten the stability of Lebanon more than 25 years after the signing of the Taif Accord.

Transparency International. *Lebanon*. <https://www.transparency.org/country/LBN#> (accessed May 4, 2018).

Transparency International's website included a wealth of data about the high level of corruption in Lebanon. In a 2017 corruption perceptions index sponsored by Transparency International, Lebanon was ranked as the 37th most corrupt country in the world and far more corrupt than most other states in the Middle East and North Africa with the only exceptions being Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, all states in the midst of war. The report helped me understand the level of corruption in Lebanon in a comparative framework as well as the nature of corruption in Lebanon.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Syria Refugee Response Lebanon: Time-series Syrian Refugees Registered by Cadastral in Lebanon as of 30 April, 2014." *Reliefweb*. April 30, 2014, <https://reliefweb.int/map/lebanon/syria-refugee-response-lebanon-time-series-syrian-refugees-registered-cadastral-lebanon> (accessed January 14, 2018).

I used this United Nations chart in my appendix. The chart showed data over time of the number of Syrian refugees who had fled to Lebanon by 2014. Since then another half million refugees have fled to the country. The chart provided a visual representation of the extent to which the Syrian refugee population could potentially be destabilizing to Lebanon and thus how resilient the Taif Accord has been in keeping the peace in Lebanon despite criticisms that it is an imperfect agreement.

Secondary Sources

Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East. "Understanding Lebanese Confessionalism." *CJPME Factsheet 26*, (May 2007). http://www.cjpme.org/fs_026 (accessed December 29, 2017).

This article helped me understand the concept of confessionalism and how confessional or sectarian-based quotas are used to allocate political and administrative positions in Lebanon. The article also helped me understand the historical development of sectarianism in Lebanon and how sectarian structures have inhibited the development of democracy in the country.

Chafik, Nadine. "Hezbollah: The Paradox of Influence." *Salus Journal* 1, no. 1 (2013). http://www.salusjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2013/03/Chafik_Salus_Journal_Issue_1_Number_1_2013_pp_2-18.pdf (accessed January 29, 2018).

This article helped me understand the historical formation of Hezbollah and was especially useful in helping me understand the reasons that Hezbollah was not demobilized after the Lebanese civil war ended in 1990 as were all the other militias.

Facing History and Ourselves. "Territorial Changes of the Ottoman Empire." <https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/gallery/territorial-changes-ottoman-empire-1817-1913#9> (accessed March 13, 2018).

I used maps from this website in my appendix to show that Lebanon was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire for hundreds of years before it was occupied by the French in World War I.

Faour, Muhammad. "The Demography of Lebanon: A Reappraisal." *Middle Eastern Studies*, 27, no. 4 (October 1991): 631-641.

This article provided me with detailed information about changing population figures in Lebanon. The article highlighted the political reasons that prevented Lebanon from conducting any formal census after 1932. It helped

me understand the political significance of the overall decline in the Christian population since independence in 1943 and how this was one of the primary reasons that led to civil war in 1975.

Faris, Hani. "The Failure of Peacemaking in Lebanon, 1975-1989." In *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction*, edited by Deidre Collins, 17-30. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994.

This chapter helped me understand the various failed foreign-sponsored attempts to negotiate a political settlement to the Lebanese Civil War from 1975 to 1989. The chapter helped me understand the positions of the various Lebanese political actors and why it was so difficult to find a political solution to the conflict. The chapter also helped me understand the differences between the earlier agreements and the Taif Accord, which ultimately provided the basis for a peace settlement.

Firro, Kais. *Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State Under the Mandate*. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003.

This book helped me understand the emergence and spread of Lebanese nationalism as opposed to Arab or Syrian nationalism. The book explains how all three concepts of identity co-existed and competed with each other during the French Mandate. The book helped me understand the rationale behind each of the three ideas and the extent to which they were adopted by different peoples throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.

Harris, William. *The New Face of Lebanon: History's Revenge*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006.

This book provided me with a very detailed account of all aspects of the Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Accord. The book provided important contextual information that helped me understand Lebanese history and the interplay of international actors and the influence they have historically had on Lebanon's politics. It was especially helpful in explaining the role played by the United States and France in Lebanese affairs.

Hirst, David. *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East*. New York: Nation Books, 2010.

This book helped me understand the intricate factors that led to the Lebanese Civil War that began in 1975 as well as how external actors played on internal Lebanese fissures to make the war last as long as it did. The book provided a detailed account of the war itself as well as the problems that Lebanon has continued to face in the aftermath of the war. It was especially useful in helping me understand the Israeli role in Lebanese affairs and the impact Israel had on the war in Lebanon.

Khazen, Farid el-. *The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact*. Oxford: Centre For Lebanese Studies, 1991.

<http://www.lebanesestudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/8b844d712.-The-Communal-Pact-of-National-Identities-The-Making-and-Politics-of-the-1943-National-Pact-Farid-el-Khazen-1991.pdf> (accessed January 8, 2018).

This online book was by far the best source that I found for describing the 1943 National Pact. It helped me understand the political situation in Lebanon in the 1930s and 1940s and how the Lebanese political elite came up with the unwritten National Pact as a compromise solution that enabled them to present a united front in demanding independence from France. The book also helped me understand how important the National Pact has continued to be in Lebanese politics even though it is an unwritten document.

Leenders, Reinoud. "Nobody Having too Much to Answer for: Laissez-Faire, Networks, and Postwar Reconstruction in Lebanon." In *Networks of Privilege in the Middle East*, edited by Steven Heydeman, 169-200. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

This chapter was useful in helping me understand how the sectarian-based patronage networks in Lebanon facilitated the establishment of an extreme version of laissez-faire economic policy with the state taking a minimal role in social welfare or any other form of economic intervention. Economic policy in Lebanon became geared toward serving the interests of international traders and financial intermediaries resulting in extreme economic inequalities in the country.

Lenzowski, George. *The Middle East in World Affairs*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980.

This book provided a detailed account of the post-World War I settlements that divided the former Arab Ottoman provinces among the French and British and the historical development of the newly established Arab states. The book helped me understand the context in which the French Mandate over Syria and Lebanon was established.

Maila, Joseph. "The Taif Accord: An Evaluation." In *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction*, edited by Deidre Collins, 31-44. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994.

This chapter helped me understand the complexity of the negotiations process that ultimately resulted in the Taif Accord. It was especially useful in helping me understand the role played by Saudi Arabia and the Arab League in bringing the Lebanese parliamentarians to the negotiating table and putting forward the kinds of guarantees and promises to all parties that eventually convinced them to make the compromises that resulted in a peace agreement.

Mackey, Sandra. *Lebanon: Death of a Nation*. New York: Congdon & Weed Inc., 1989.

This book helped me understand aspects of Lebanese culture that facilitated the institutionalization of sectarianism and the outbreak of the devastating civil war. The book was especially useful in explaining the concept of *zuama*, the Lebanese sectarian based feudal leaders who built up elaborate

patronage systems that continue to define political and economic relations in Lebanon. The book described how these relationships worked. The book influenced the manner by which I wrote about the impact of sectarianism on Lebanon's political structure and influenced me to include information about the importance of patron-client relations.

Makdisi, Samir. *The Lessons of Lebanon: The Economics of War*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

This book helped me understand the economic dimension of the Lebanese Civil War, especially the way that different sectarian elites and militia leaders were able to exploit poorer elements of their sect during the war.

Makdisi, Samir and Richard Sadaka. "The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990." In *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 59-86. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2005.

This chapter from a World Bank sponsored study attempting to find reasons for the continuation of civil wars helped me understand that one of the main reasons the Lebanese Civil War lasted so long was how economically beneficial it was to the militia leaders, who were able to make billions of dollars from stealing, taxing people and trade, or as forms of external aid.

Picard, Elizabeth. *Lebanon: A Shattered Country*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1996.

This book, along with that of Traboulsi, was one of the most useful secondary sources that I used for providing an overall historical context for the arguments that I made in my paper. While this book is not as detailed as Traboulsi's book, it is more clearly written and much easier to understand. The book was especially useful in helping me understand how certain aspects of French policy during the French occupation of the country between World War I and World War II set the stage for many of the sectarian problems that came to dominate Lebanese politics in its latter history.

Quinn, Josephine Crawley. *In Search of the Phoenicians*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. <https://reader.paperc.com/books/in-search-of-the-phoenicians/903944/ch04> (accessed January 28, 2018).

This online book review helped me understand the context of the Maronite claim that they were descended from the ancient Phoenicians. I also used a map from the site in my appendix to show the areas that were added to Mount Lebanon during the French Mandate, in the French hope of establishing a viable, Christian-led state in the Middle East.

Rogan, Eugene. *The Arabs*. New York: Basic Books, 2009.

This book provides a detailed history of the Arab world that helped me place the events that took place in Lebanon in a larger context. The book was especially useful in helping me understand why Lebanon as a state was rejected by a large number, if not the majority, of Lebanese when it was first

proposed by the French. The book explained how historically many Lebanese identified themselves as part of a larger Syria and saw Lebanon as an artificial imperial creation.

Rosiny, Stephan. "Power-Sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon's Taif Experience." *Middle East Policy* 20, no. 3 (Fall 2013). <http://www.mepec.org/power-sharing-syria-lessons-lebanons-taif-experience> (accessed January 30, 2018).

This article, written almost a quarter of a century after the Taif Accord was signed, helped me understand how the agreement was able to endure and provide peace in Lebanon despite its shortcomings. The article, in fact, argued that the Taif Accord could provide the most durable model for a lasting peace agreement for neighboring Syria, which has been wracked by civil war since 2011. The article helped me understand the enduring impact of the Taif Accord and how it could potentially provide lessons and perhaps even a framework or model for solving ethnic or religious based civil conflicts in other parts of the globe.

Salibi, Kamal. "The Lebanese Identity." *Journal of Contemporary History* 6, no. 1 (1971), 76-86. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/259624> (accessed January 30, 2018).

This article written before the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War discussed the issue of Lebanese identity throughout the period from the 19th century up through 1970. The article helped me understand changes in how various Lebanese people identified themselves from the late 19th century up through the years just before the outbreak of the civil war. The author notes that the concept of a particular Lebanese identity was almost purely a Christian viewpoint until the late 1950s and 1960s when some Muslims started to identify themselves as Lebanese, but even then the question of identity was very contested and most Muslims continued identifying more as Arabs than as distinctly Lebanese.

Seale, Patrick. *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

This biography of the leading Sunni political figure in Lebanon's independence movement helped me understand the compromises that took place in the 1940s between the Maronites and the Sunnis that ultimately enabled Lebanon to gain its independence from the French in 1943. The book provided excellent context for understanding why those compromises were necessary at the time that they were made.

Thompson, Elizabeth. *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

This book provided me with a lot of details about the social history of Lebanon during the French occupation. It was very useful in that it discussed aspects of the occupation that were not discussed that frequently in other books,

especially concerning the French influence on Lebanese culture and how that influence was different among Muslims and Christians. It was especially useful in helping me understand how the French doled out access to state jobs and other economic benefits in ways that aggravated sectarian tensions and how Maronites came to have a privileged position in Lebanon during the occupation.

Traboulsi, Fawwaz. *A History of Modern Lebanon*. London: Pluto Press, 2007.

This book provided me with a very detailed account of Lebanon's history and especially how the different religious sects interacted over time. The book helped me understand the intricate political relations within sects as well as between sects and how the civil war affected the political, social, and economic conditions of various Lebanese groups. This book provided me with more historical context than any other secondary source.

White, Mathew. "War in Lebanon." *Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century*. July 2000. <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/lebanon.htm> (accessed January 31, 2018).

I used maps from this website that showed areas of control in Lebanon in 1976 and 1987 in my appendix. The maps show who controlled what areas of the country in 1976, soon after the civil war broke out and approximately 30,000 Syrian troops had entered Lebanon ostensibly as a peacekeeping force and controlled most of Lebanon's territory. The map helped me understand where the allied Sunni, Druze, Shiite, and Palestinian forces were located at the time as well as the areas that were largely under Maronite control. The maps helped me to visually understand how the situation had become more complex by 1987. Israel had invaded Lebanon in 1982 and forced most of the Palestinian fighters out and Israeli forces continued holding a small belt of territory in southern Lebanon. New Shiite militias, most notably Hezbollah and Amal, had taken control of vast amounts of territory as had a Druze militia. The maps helped me see that the Maronite controlled areas remained largely the same, helping me understand why by that time many Maronites were calling for the establishment of an independent Maronite state.


Zunes, Stephen. "Washington's Proxy War." In *The War on Lebanon: A Reader*, edited by Nubar Hovsepian, 93-118. Northampton, Mass: Olive Branch Press, 2008.

This article provided me with an in-depth explanation for Israel's objectives in attacking Lebanon in 2006. The article explained that Israel was encouraged to attack by the U.S. administration, which felt that Hezbollah's continuing presence as an armed Islamist militia that was actively involved in politics, including having a number of parliamentary seats, was seen as a threat to U.S. interests in Lebanon and the wider Middle East. The article helped me understand the precarious nature of Lebanon in 2006 and how violent acts by outside actors against Lebanon as well as the continued armed presence of the Hezbollah militia inside Lebanon constituted continued threats to Lebanon's stability.



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